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ABSTRACT: Reviewing Arjen Kleinherenbrink’s recent book, Against Continuity: Gilles 
Deleuze's Speculative Realism (2019), this paper undertakes a detailed review of 
Kleinherenbrink’s fourfold “externality thesis” vis-à-vis Deleuze’s machine ontology. Reading 
Deleuze as a philosopher of the actual, this paper renders Deleuzean syntheses as passive 
contemplations, pulling other (passive) entities into an (active) experience and designating 
relations as expressed through contraction. In addition to reviewing Kleinherenbrink’s book 
(which argues that the machine ontology is a guiding current that emerges in Deleuze’s work 
after Difference and Repetition) alongside much of Deleuze’s oeuvre, we relate and juxtapose 
Deleuze’s machine ontology to positions concerning externality held by a host of speculative 
realists. Arguing that the machine ontology has its own account of interaction, change, and 
novelty, we ultimately set to prove that positing an ontological “cut” on behalf of the virtual 
realm is unwarranted because, unlike the realm of actualities, it is extraneous to the structure of 
becoming—that is, because it cannot be homogenous, any theory of change vis-à-vis the virtual 
makes it impossible to explain how and why qualitatively different actualities are produced.  
KEYWORDS: Ontology; Speculative Philosophy; Deleuze; Object-Oriented Ontology; 
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§ INTRODUCTION 
Following Arjen Kleinherenbrink’s Against Continuity: Gilles Deleuze’s Speculative 
Realism (2019)—arguably one of the closest and most rigorous secondary readings 
of Deleuze’s oeuvre—this paper seeks to demonstrate how any relation between 
machines immediately engenders a new machine, accounting for machinic 
circuits of activity where becoming, or processes of generation, are always 
necessarily irreducible to their generators. Thus, navigating Kleinherenbrink’s 
work and Deleuze’s literature, this paper treats reality as a byproduct of 
discontinuity, where direct contact between the interior (virtual) and real (actual) 
being of machines is necessarily foreclosed. Rather than privileging Deleuze as a 
theorist of  the virtual, this paper situates Deleuze’s virtual as non-relational excess 
over and above all other relations while treating continuity as dependent upon 
the Idea, powers (puissance), or singularities of any machine in question. By 
relating and distinguishing aspects of Deleuze’s externality thesis, where no 
machine is reducible to another, this position opposes a recently popularized 
interpretation of Deleuze by theorists who proffer the “aisthetic perspective” of 
relation or stoke Deleuzean approaches to “affect” that hierarchize the virtual, 
thereby prioritizing continuity.1 I argue that this interpretation fundamentally 
misreads Deleuze and mischaracterizes continuity as a product of direct contact 
between intensities and the processes comprising such intensities; it is, in fact, due 
to the “sense-event,” as it corresponds to actuality, that the virtual aspect of any 
two machines is precluded from coming into direct contact.  
In addition to reviewing Kleinherenbrink’s book (which argues that the 
 
1 Theorists of media and complex computational systems have perhaps been some of the most keen to co-
opt this reading, remarking, for instance, that "[d]espite the fact that, from a strict and orthodox Deleuzian 
perspective, the aesthetic and the computational are two divergent modes of relating to the real, it is my 
contention that aisthetic accounts of computational systems have adopted Deleuze’s aesthetics of ontological 
continuity and extended it to account for what is not continuous: digital computation." This “aisthetic 
perspective” treats novelty as “the activity of conception-perception. In other words, it concerns both 
thinking and feeling as ontogenetic activities (i.e., activities that generate being) [….] for Deleuze, aesthetics 
is not only about feeling, but about thinking too. I can add now that this thought, however, is of a particular 
kind: it is non-cognitive, apersonal, and irreducible to a single content, a single origin, or a single experience 
of it. The best way to describe it is to call it abstract thought or indeed virtual thought.” In some instances, 
these approaches privilege the virtual, which we will make a case against. M. Beatriz Fazi, Contingent 
Computation: Abstraction, Experience, and Indeterminacy in Computational Aesthetics, New York, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2018, p. 10, p. 34. 
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machine ontology is a guiding current that emerges in Deleuze’s work after 
Difference and Repetition) alongside Deleuze’s primary texts, we will also relate 
Deleuze’s machine ontology to positions held by a host of speculative realists and 
object-oriented ontologists such as Levi Bryant, Maurizio Ferraris, Markus 
Gabriel, Manuel DeLanda, Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, and Bruno 
Latour. Arguing that the machine ontology has its own account of interaction, 
change, and novelty, I ultimately set to prove that Deleuze is by no means a 
reductionist, positing that the any “cut” on behalf of the virtual realm is never 
warranted because, unlike the realm of actualities, it is necessarily inconsistent—
that is, because it cannot be homogenous, any theory of change vis-à-vis the 
virtual makes it impossible to explain how and why qualitatively different 
actualities are produced. Preferring a machine ontology of the actual to an 
ontology derived from the virtual, this paper also engages with a new and 
emerging interpretation of Deleuze termed “differential heterogenesis,” where 
externality is treated as it exists between processes.  
§ ON DELEUZEAN EXTERNALITY: THE MECHANOSPHERE AND 
AUTOPOIESIS 
Kleinherenbrink delineates how Deleuze’s assertion in Two Regimes of 
Madness—that everything is a machine, whether it is “real, contrived or 
imaginary”2—illuminates that the machinic assemblage is infrastructural, 
wherefore it does not exercise a hierarchical circuitry of linealities and 
supervenience. Thus, Deleuze’s “mechanic” does not describe a mechanical 
domain opposed to an organic, or non-mechanical one. Similarly, the organic 
domain ought not be set within a dialectic relation to the non-organ machine—
the Deleuzean “thesis of machines is univocity, meaning that there is no 
biosphere or noosphere but everywhere the same Mechanosphere.”3 
 Deleuze’s mention of the Mechanosphere may remind the systems theory 
privy philosophical reader of Schelling’s philosophy of identity, where nature is 
 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness—Texts and Interviews 1975 - 1995, trans. A. Hodges and M. Taormina, 
New York, Semiotext(e), 2006, p. 17. 
3 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. B. Massumi, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 69. 
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conceived of as something that is neither in us nor outside of  us but, instead, is that 
which actively abolishes subject-object dualism. Schelling’s system proffers 
recursivity as a “self-contained whole”—this marks the philosophical crux of 
organicism as a foundation for thinking of an open system through meta-scalar self-
organization, anticipating biological models such as Ilya Prigogine’s dissipative 
system or Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana’s autopoiesis. Within 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature (which also informs contemporaneous models 
such as Yuk Hui’s organismic conception of spatiality, a model that destabilizes the 
conception of our world as a closed and static material system), not only is each 
organism understood as “self-contained” but, also, always “influenced by other 
organisms” such that any “internal finality” affirms a structural “external 
finality.”4 Notably, geologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s technologically-
rendered “noosphere” or environmentally-oriented models such as Lynn 
Margulis and James Lovelock’s “artificial earth” (or “Gaia hypothesis”) 
significantly diverge from Schelling’s “general organism” insofar as Chardin, 
Margulis, and Lovelock are concerned with the cosmotechnical realization of a 
superorganism, whereas Schelling’s conception of nature resists absolutization, 
postulated upon non-objective original productivity. 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie emphasizes nature’s resisting stasis and, therefore, 
is a precursor to contemporaneous biological organicism. Given Schelling’s 
emphasis on an external force’s giving form to nature’s production, Schelling’s 
work here engages, to some degree, with Hegel’s departure from preformation 
towards immanent negativity. However, for Hegel nature is an object of observing 
reason from the outside, while Schelling’s conception of nature renders it as pre-
consciously sensed prior to becoming an object of reflection. Contra Schelling’s 
emphasis on the external force giving form to the productive force in nature, with 
Hegel—who moves away from nature-as-preformation and re-introduces 
contingency in nature—formal actuality is met with the encounter of absolute 
necessity.5 When determined as objective/artefactual, models such as Joseph 
Needham’s proto-machinic organicism organize the attendant biology of the 
 
4 Yuk Hui, Recursivity and Contingency, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, p. 163. 
5 G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. G. D. Giovanni, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, pp. 480-481. 
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noosphere to establish an ontic hierarchy that begins with cognitive technicity. In 
contrast, however, Deleuze’s Mechanosphere, as well as his overall theory of 
machines, is fundamentally flat, discontinuous, and infrastructural, as Deleuzean 
externality is premised upon irreducibility. 
In opposition to Platonism, or internalism—which results from the private 
depth of machines being irreducible to and unique in kind from their 
actualizations—our fundamental error of thinking, according to Deleuze, is to 
conflate the contiguity, identity, and resemblance characterizing actuality as also 
characterizing “things in themselves.” Therefore, “every entity is itself  a machine, 
in the sense of being a causally effective agent that makes its own difference in 
the world” where each entity has its own unique “complex inner working.”6 
Unlike the approaches produced by systems theory and cybernetics (particularly 
second order cybernetics and the Shannon-Ashby informatic-constructivist 
treatment of information, which is predicated upon environmental adequation), 
Deleuze’s externality necessarily cannot be reduced into exhaustive organic or 
biological relations, as external entities are not self-caused or “reducible to 
anything else,” for “[e]verything must happen between entities themselves.”7 
Rather than being positioned between the taut hold of discretization and 
irreducibility, Deleuze’s image of reality invokes a tetravalent ontological 
structure where entities are involved in producing, altering, and destroying one 
another, resulting in genesis, endurance, alteration, and termination. In contrast 
to the mechanical-biological totality of a “general organ(ism),” these infra-
interactive machines do not uphold geologic recollection that presents itself 
through relations or direct contact. Thus, Deleuzean machines are not 
representations (or “simulacra”) and cannot be further reduced to discourse, 
power, relations, subjectivity, language, ideology and so on, but are “[a]s real as 
it gets.”8 Moving forward, let us examine how the actual, in Deleuze, serves as a 
representative limit upon the asymptotic processes of formation (i.e., stratification 
and destratification).  
 
6 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity: Gilles Deleuze’s Speculative Realism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2019, p. 7. 
7 Ibid., p. 5. 
8 Ibid., p. 37. 
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§ RELATIONALITY 
According to Quentin Meillassoux’s thesis, the human-world relation is the sole 
relation to which we have direct access and this relationship mediates all of our 
thinking, such that cognition necessarily corresponds to being.9 Correlationism is 
fundamental to the Kantian-Copernican thesis on finitude, where we can only 
know the world through our human-transcendental a priori intuitions and 
categories. Accordingly, despite Kantian correlationism concedes that we can 
never know of noumena, the "thing-in-itself," it also produce an identity-relation, 
contending that we will know (and can only know) the correlation between the 
“thing-in-itself ” and ourselves, or the correlation between thought and being; this 
is the marker of Kant’s idealist ontology. Securing the autonomy of being, 
Meillassoux rejoins Badiou’s early attempt to forge an epistemological basis for a 
materialist ontology by pointing to kenotypic indices or pre-anthropomorphic 
scientific vestiges of ancestrality, such as the arche-fossil. Thereby, Meillassoux’s 
speculative position is concerned with securing the subject's place before the 
absolute and establishing a presuppositionless science. Meillassoux underscores 
the strong correlationist’s tacit endorsement of the possibility of things to be other 
than as they appear, a product of the duplicitous position stoked by the 
contingency of the thinking subject. Via the principle of  factiality (i.e., the necessary 
contingency of every being), or the Principle of Unreason:  
“I maintain that I can attain a speculative materialism which clearly refutes 
correlationism. I can think an X independent of any thinking and I know this, 
thanks to the correlationist himself and his fight against the absolute. The principle 
of factiality unveils the ontological truth hidden beneath the radical skepticism of 
modern philosophy: to be is not to be a correlate, but to be a fact: to be is to be 
factual—and this is a not a fact.”10 
Accordingly, what Meillassoux terms the principle of factiality illuminates the 
necessary contingency of every being, which consequently “grounds the non-
dogmatic, non-metaphysical Absolute in speculative materialism.”11 Meillassoux’s 
conclusion on the in-itself ’s independent existence thus regards a derivation that 
 
9 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude—An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. R. Brassier, London, 
Continuum, 2011. 
10 Quentin Meillassoux, “Time without Becoming,” lecture at Middlesex University, London, 8 May 2008. 
Accessed at http://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/resources/, p. 1 (22 April 2020). 
11 Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumenon, 2020, ed. N. Brown, p. 86. (Manuscript in preparation.) 
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the virtual, or that which he elsewhere terms factiality, is necessarily posed against 
contingency, or pure potentiality. Thus, “[f]actiality stipulates that every intra-
worldly law is itself contingent and thus possible of being otherwise.”12 Positively 
exploring forms of asubjective reality through utterly rational chaos, 
Meillassoux’s chaosmos is not necessarily comprised of intractable knowledge, 
which is the case for Deleuze’s chaosmos. Deleuze’s chaosmos is the conception 
of irrational flux intractable to any determinate knowledge—the “in-between” of 
milieus before any progression is constituted, an intensive spatium which 
underlies individuation (i.e., the Body without Organs, etc.).13 This is because, 
within Deleuze’s system, every causal linear dynamic is embedded or implies the 
ground of intensity as pre-individual intensity, with the chaosmos the locus of the 
eternal return that is the internal identity of the world of displacement and 
reconstitution.14 Meillassoux, on the other hand, finds his chaosmos of absolute 
contingency as designated by the semiotic order of the “meaningless sign,” or 
what Meillassoux terms the “kenotype” (i.e., that which organizes the formal 
ideography of mathematical discourse).15 This kenotype is posed against the 
“semantic” correlations in languages that pertain to the domain of sense 
(qualitative specificity) and, therefore, the subject’s experiential world, tying 
Meillassoux, and his chaosmos, to a realist non-metaphysics. Despite the stark 
differences, Deleuze’s machine ontology is also markedly realist and speculative, as 
entities are machines qua machines and stoked by incremental/differential 
heterogenesis—therefore, they are not involved in creating meaning “for us.” It is 
explicitly in this sense that the ontological structure of Deleuze’s machines are 
“progressively deduced from the externality thesis, instead of being empirically 
 
12 Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects, London, Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 106. 
13 Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 335. 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 
57, p. 199, p. 219, p. 299. 
15 “In that case, the kenotype would be nothing other than the concept of a sign considered as a mark, as a 
material and individual thing pending its designation [….] The kenotype would then be nothing more than 
a concept: the concept of ‘a’ that is instantiated by this or that material a.” Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, 
Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Sign Devoid of Meaning,” trans. R. Mackay and M. 
Gansen, in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity Since Structuralism, Bloomsbury, London, 2016, 
p. 167. 
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observed.”16  
The aforementioned reading(s) of Deleuze as a philosopher of the virtual 
draw upon defining features of the virtual realm as events, processes, intensities, 
or denizens that exist in mutual continuity up to the point of collectively 
comprising one “force.” Articulating their expressions in terms of actual experience, 
however, shifts the focus of Deleuze’s ontology from one that prioritizes the 
immaterial wellspring of multiplicities (i.e., the virtual) qua subtending material 
actualization and allocating spatial explication to a logic of separation and 
serialization qua relation-hood. With the introduction of “surfaces” in The Logic 
of  Sense, we see that here, and in other later works, Deleuze replaces the notion 
of the virtual realm (where, between entities, there are categorical intensive 
differences vis-à-vis the virtual realm) with an ontology according to which 
entities, themselves, “are granted a private virtual aspect.”17 The reconceived virtual 
aspect constitutes a kind of excess over and above an entity’s relations, which allows 
for Deleuze to account for change and interaction, “thus rendering the existence 
of a virtual realm to do such work superfluous.”18 Consequently, according to this 
reading of heterogeneity, the virtual is recounted as that which is decidedly non-
machinic—continuous instead of discontinuous, intensive instead of extensive, 
and non-relational—while the machine is understood as a “minimum real unit.” 
This is what Kleinherenbrink refers to as Deleuze’s “second ontology,” which is 
no longer premised on the notion of a single, universal difference that divides 
reality into a bifurcated virtual and actual realm but, instead, formulates an 
internal difference in kind between a virtual and actual aspect, which constitutes 
the ontological structure of all entities—this is a kind of “internal difference,” or a 
“difference” that is not exterior or superior to the thing.”19 In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze further bifurcates every object into two halves resembling one 
another, “one being a virtual image and the other an actual image” affected by 
“differentiation” which, “itself already has two aspects of its own” that “in turn 
 
16 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 11. 
17 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 36. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts—1953 - 1974, trans. M. Taormina, New York, Semiotext(e), 
2004, pp. 32-33. 
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has two aspects.20” Elsewhere, Deleuze further describes this division as 
consisting of an: 
 “ideal half submerged in the virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential 
relations and on the other by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted 
on the one hand by the qualities actualizing those relations and on the other by the 
parts actualizing those singularities.”21  
Accordingly, this “fourfold” world consists of a twofold virtual depth and a 
twofold actual surface, where distinction is carved along “unity of the multiple” in 
the “objective sense” and, on the other end, a “multiplicity ‘of ’ one and a unity 
‘of ’ the multiple, but now in a subjective sense.”22 The virtual, irreducible, or 
“objective” aspect of every entity is, thus, one and multiple at the same time; 
contra the ontological structure of the actual, the (two) aspects of the virtual 
concern themselves with the non-relational being of a machine. If it is from 
Spinoza that Deleuze inherits Oneness (albeit sans divine connection) and from 
Leibniz the thesis of the multiple, it is via Husserl that Deleuze is interested in 
qualitative distinction re: objects demarcated from their semblance via subjective, 
relational, or actual encounters, events, or experiences (i.e., “distinguishing this 
from that”).23  
Grounding individual entities within processes, for Deleuze processes are not 
determined as continuous universals or understood via an underlying event 
existing “in addition to machines.”24 Deleuze’s conception of process is tripartite: 
first, there is no transcendent factor that connects machines and, second, there is 
no distinction between man and nature. What both these factors demonstrate is 
that “process” evinces how machinic being “happens everywhere”; the most 
important aspect of the Deleuzean machinic process is that the process, itself, is 
not an “end in itself, nor must it be confused with an infinite perpetuation of 
itself.”25 This evidences that the schizo-process is not a continuous, universal, or 
 
20 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 209-210. 
21 Ibid., pp. 279-290. 
22 Gilles Deleuze, the Fold—Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. T. Conley, London, Continuum, 1993, p. 145. 
23 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p. 40. 
25 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, H.R. Lane, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 15. 
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underlying event that exists in addition to machinology. In short, Deleuze’s externality 
thesis states that all entities have an extra-relational aspect, a residue of excess 
and superfluity. Devoid of a universal background, externality is necessarily 
composed of a processes that consists of breaks and stops/cuts,26 whereby 
permanence, emergence, production generation and change emerge as passive 
syntheses of time: 
“[t]hey describe how one entity relates to another (connection), how it manages to 
do so while remaining irreducible (disjunction), and how new entities are created 
(conjunction). They are ‘temporal’ because they account for how things happen; 
‘passive’ because they are independent of memory, understanding will, recognition 
and consciousness; ‘productive’ because they account for the forging of relations; 
‘registrative’ because they account for the alteration of individual essences; and 
‘consumptive’ because they account for the birth and death of entities. These 
syntheses are not successive, but always ‘overlap’….A human spotting a friend is a 
case of the three syntheses, but so is a meteor striking the moon, or my finger 
striking my keyboard.”27  
§ LEVI BRYANT’S TWOFOLD MACHINIC ONTOLOGY 
While much of Bryant’s work is premised on Deleuze’s externality thesis, Bryant’s 
ontology of “twofold machines” suggests that externality does not necessitate a 
fourfold latticework; according to Bryant’s construction, entities are divided, as 
they “have their manifestations in relations to others, plus their non-relational 
interior constitution.”28 Bryant’s Difference and Givenness outlines his fundamental 
“ontocology,” which is formulated around the relational appearance of entities 
vis-à-vis other relations, as opposed to their private being.29 Bryant’s reading of 
Deleuze emphasizes Deleuze’s critique of presence—the belief that the experience 
of an entity is identical to its Being—by showing how Deleuze disentangles 
presentist philosophical positions that reduce reality to thoughts concerning it. 
From transcendental idealism, “where the subject imposes form on the world,” 
to absolute materialism, “where all is matter and configurations of atoms,” and 
 
26 Ibid., p. 26. 
27 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 41. 
28 Ibid., 42. 
29 Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Givenness—Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence, 
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2008. 
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the realist position, “where the subject somehow immediately knows the world,” 
all such epistemologies “assume the primacy of some form of presence.”30  
Bryant’s externality thesis originally denied that any entity serves as the 
universal ground of another and, following both the anti-correlationist position 
and the object-oriented ontologist notion of withdrawal, Bryant maintained that 
no entity ever directly encounters the interiority of another being. While he was 
privy to terming entities as “objects,” with his most recent book, Onto-Cartography, 
Bryant has utilized the differential entity as a means of characterizing 
manifestation as machinic. Prioritizing relation itself, Bryant’s position does not 
present the “thing-in-manifestation” as reducible to subject-object internal 
conditions (e.g., the perceptual experience of a couch and its qualities). Instead, 
the “becoming” of a manifestation is related to connecting previously 
unconnected determinations, thereby compositing a “problem” (a concept that 
we will return to) qua actualization without a homologous representation.31 Here, 
the manifestation of an entity is never a single, homogenous milieu or 
phenomenon but split between qualitative rhythms/processes, nested within its 
agentive material dimension, and the content of its experience.32 This bifurcation 
delineates “the qualities characterizing an experience on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the unified thing—immanent to the relation—of which they are 
qualities.”33  
For Bryant, the interior being of a machine is fully determined by its powers. 
What, then, is to be said of the non-relational or private interior of entities? In 
accordance with Deleuze’s terms, the interior being of a machine is necessarily 
unified with its multiplicity, preventing continuity and allotting identity (erecting 
 
30 Ibid., p. 264. 
31 An example that Bryant provides is the process of learning to swim, recalling a favorite example of 
Deleuze: “I do not know what is of my body and what is of my water, which is why we can say of learning 
how to swim that it is a form of 'becoming-water' without resembling water. The consequence of this process 
of actualization through the posing of a problem is that the illusion is created where I experience these 
singularities of my body and the water as if they were always-already there, rather than a product of genesis 
in learning how to swim. A new body and water is generated in learning how to swim, but curiously it seems 
as if it were already there once I have learnt how to swim.” Levi R. Bryant, “Deleuze’s Infernal Book: 
Reflections on Difference and Repetition,” Deleuze and Guattari Studies, vol. 14, is. 1, p. 23. 
32 Levi R. Bryant, Onto-Cartography—An Ontology of Machines and Media, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2014, p. 96. 
33 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 45. 
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a kind of firewall between machines, a non-relational means of separation). 
According to our ontology of externality, we must account for the radical 
separation between machines: as a non-phenomenological treatment, or a non-
relational unity, this means account for why this machine is unique from that 
machine, even when “they are not looking.”34 Deleuze’s diverse world of 
experience is thus regarded not as a single, continuous, or homogenous mass but 
granted an antecedent externality.  
As of 2016, Bryant has renounced the framework of object-oriented 
externality where entities are withdrawn from each other and considered as 
irreducible to relations. With the concept of the “folding-transformation” 
affirming that that which is discrete is a “fold” within a wider field, Bryant now 
underscores knots of locality along a single integrated continuum (i.e., the 
dynamic dimension and the ongoing activity of the “pleat”). Bryant thus remarks 
that "[b]odies are not discrete, but continuous with their worlds," meaning that 
they are continuous with one another.35 Nonetheless, these folds are not subsumed 
by an all-subsuming Mechanosphere, a final entity. Instead, these folds involve a 
becoming something other, a fold-in-transformation (a tree is, therefore, not 
pieces of soil, rain, and animal life, but instead a folding-transformation of these 
things into bark, leaves, roots, and so on). By abdicating externality, Bryant exacts 
a withdrawal from the discrete entities populating Deleuze’s pluralism towards 
something more so akin to an internalist monism. The externality thesis depends 
on entities, regardless of if they are different from one another, as existing in 
discontinuous isolation or being part of a single integrated continuum.36 If 
 
34 Ibid., 46. 
35 Levi R. Bryant, “For an Ethics of the Fold,” trans. Frédéric Bisson, Multitudes, is. 65, 2016, 
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2016/11/01/for-an-ethics-of-the-fold/ (English translation accessed on 
4 February 2020), p. 2.  
36 Byrant’s ontology of the pleated fold opts solely for the latter, the single integrated continuum. How, then, 
do entities fare within Bryant’s single isolated continuum? Consider the following example: “[t]he tree in 
Albuquerque speaks to the remote history that created soil conditions, to industrial factories across the globe 
that contribute to air conditions, to volcanic eruptions in Iceland that deposit soot across the globe, to 
insects, and animals and other plants of all kinds that populate its branches, fertilize its flowers, and carry 
its seeds away. The tree appears to stand alone but pleats all of these things into it. The names of lovers 
carved into its trunk will influence the growth of its bark for years to come in incalculable ways, creating all 
sorts of unexpected patterns in the bark to come. The farsighted person—which we all are—can never fully 
discern the immense depths of what bodies implicate in pleating themselves from differences arising from 
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externality holds, “then entities are split between relational manifestations and 
their private being.”37 In short, externality evinces a strict discontinuity between 
interior being qua immediacy and interior being qua exigency. 
§ EXTERNALITY AND THE ASSEMBLAGE: SOLITUDE 
According to Deleuze, the assemblage has “only itself, in connection with other 
assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs.”38 Despite the 
relations that any media object may have with its semblance, for instance, these 
relations are demanded by externality and none of these connections to other 
entities fully designates its “being.” This is a theme that Kleinherenbrink terms 
“solitude” and one which becomes pellucid in Deleuze’s books on cinema—i.e., 
solitude structures the moving images that populate Deleuze’s cinematography-
cum-world. In the “movement-image,” or the pre-World War II cinematic image, 
“vehicles or moving bodies” are understood as thoroughly relational—that is, 
they include actions, perceptions, and affections that hint at externality (or 
autonomy and materiality) but do not embrace it fully.39 In the works of 
Hitchcock, for example, Deleuze recognizes that relations are always designated 
along external terms that constantly refuse their full implication. In the post-war 
“time-image,” we see the enveloping of incompatible images, disjunct sounds, 
and, consequently, incompossible worlds that are—through editing—brought in-
common, facilitating the touching of “an outside more distant than an exterior, 
and that of an inside deeper than any interior.”40 The cinematic (time-)image 
reconstitutes intensities in a pure state, bringing them into "a relationship of 
 
the texture of the world. The farsighted only see the tornado as a Euclidean point, overlooking its dyadic 
structure or all of the eddies of turbulence that had to conspire to bring the tornado into being. They see 
only the body or pleat that is close, overlooking the internal distance of the field that the tornado has 
interiorized in coming into being. Nor is it merely that there is first the field with all its texture, its eddies, 
its turbulence, its temperatures, and its barometric pressures and that then there is the tornado as an 
accomplished body. No. The tornado lives from its field over the duration of its existence and its ontological 
consistency dissipates when the field no longer favors these gaseous vortices.” Ibid., p. 4. 
37 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 47. 
38 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 4. 
39 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1—The Movement Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, London, The 
Athlone Press, 1986, p. 23. 
40 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2—The Time Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 261. 
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complementarity" such that "[t]here is no dualism at all,” as these intensities 
indicate something “beyond” the signifier of pure representation.41 It is from this 
very incommensurability, the inextricable Outside from which emerges cinema’s 
confrontational thought, that we see inaugurated the possibility of the impossible, 
the “false image” which makes manifest a “private reality” or “virtuality of 
time.”42  
This inextricable Outside, as a functor of the thesis of externality manifest 
within the recording instrument of interpretation, transpires most markedly in 
drawing out observations derived from the past of lived experience(s). This is 
exactly why Deleuze agrees with Guattari on the importance of dreams; as the 
locus of recollection, "[d]reams have to be analyzed precisely because dreams 
[…] are what is being passed through by intensities."43 Insofar as this relates to 
cognizing, it is here that the triangulated Peircean relation of signs-to-denotata is 
processed through the “sensory motor schema,” akin to the causally-connected 
mental plane of movement-images that evolve into “cine-thinking” via the 
freedom of thinking.44 In order to further consider the constitution of meaning 
we can also turn to art that actively engages with the plane of presentation and 
exigent construction as, for example, in Marcel Duchamp’s “Fountain” 
readymade, which: 
“does not need its ‘R. Mutt’ signature in order to exist, nor does L.H/O.O.Q. need 
the moustache added to Mona Lisa. The parts of an entity are always somewhat 
redundant, a complex notion [..., which] reveal(s) that objects have no natural 
place, function, or meaning. There is nothing external constituting their essence.”45  
 
41 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Interview on Anti-Oedipus with Raymond Bellour (second meeting)” 
in Gilles Deleuze: Letters and Other Texts, ed. D. Lapoujade, trans. A. Hodges, South Pasadena, Semiotext(e), 
2020, p. 226. This is perhaps most clear in Godard’s cinema after (albeit somewhat during) his work in the 
Dziga Vertov Group, wherein Godard’s cinema “unblocks images to this point” (of reconstituting intensities 
in a pure state) “even though images can be unblocked with a fixed shot [….] There is such an 
image/intensity relationship that at the same time, the image is the extension that an intensity takes when 
it dies; but a precipitation of images or a still image where things happen in all four corners; or a color goes 
through an image and restores the intensity completely through the image.” Ibid. 
42 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2016, p. 68. 
43 Gilles Deleuze et al., “Interview on Anti-Oedipus with Raymond Bellour (second meeting),” p. 226. 
44 Éric Alliez, "Midday, Midnight: The Emergence of Cine-Thinking" in The Brain is The Screen, ed. G. 
Flaxman, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, pp. 293-303. 
45 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 57. 
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 Accordingly, the readymade teaches us that entities are obstinate 
assemblages and that all entities are, consequently, irreducible machines that 
function “smoothly with others if effort is spent in putting it to work.”46 That is, 
the “natural condition,” which is pre-observational, is that of the straited space: 
it is the necessity of imposing a scientific system and/or systematic 
scale/measurement that mends any and all aforementioned entities within 
scientific unity. Nonetheless, this irreducibility does not necessitate an entity that 
exacts absolute rule or autocratic power—for were this the case, all entities would 
be self-identical and, thus, reducible to themselves. Deleuze’s ecology of the 
assemblage, a synonym for machine, designates how any system emerges from 
relations between heterogenous parts. Deleuze’s world of externality is one in 
which “no two grains of dust are absolutely identical, no two hands have the same 
distinctive points, no two typewriters have the same strike, no two revolvers score 
their bullets in the same manner.”47 This absolute refusal of internality 
necessitates that there be no principle frontier of passage between universal and 
particulars.48 Externality require that there be a difference in kind between 
metaphysical surfaces and physical surfaces of each entity, such that all entities 
are spatially, temporally and mereologically irreducible.49 Therefore, primary 
and secondary qualities, parts, functions, wholes, and predicates are brought into 
an ecology of relational aspects that always implies other entities’ necessity. 
Because the absolute Being of any entity is foreclosed from its disclosure qua 
human relation, Deleuze does not commit to an epistemological realism. As in the 
case of Hegel and Leibniz, Deleuze explicitly rejects the expression of totality 
within isolation, or what Deleuze terms an “orgiastic representation,”50 where 
instead of subordinating discrete entities to discrete “bigger things,” or larger 
assemblages, philosophy assimilates all things into a whole of which they are 
expressions or onto which they converge. In the case of Aristotelianism, for 
instance, organic representation presents itself in Aristotle’s edict that “opposites alone 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 26. 
48 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 132. 
49 Ibid., p. 125. 
50 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xv, p. 42. 
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cannot be present together.”51 For example, this absorption of a “womb” into 
“finite determination” transpires as the absorption of everything into the 
“infinitely large,” as exemplified by Hegel, where “we have before us the 
alternating determination of the finite and the infinite; the finite is finite only with 
reference to the ought or the infinite, and the infinite is only infinite with 
reference to the finite. The two are inseparable and at the same time absolutely 
other with respect of each other.”52 Because Hegel cannot conceive of that which 
is finite in and of itself, Deleuze rejects Hegelianism for not granting entities their 
private reality outside of mediated relations (or synthesis).  
According to Leibniz’ monadology, monads are regarded as “neither 
substance nor accident” and “have no extension, no shape, and cannot be 
divided.”53 Despite this may appear, at first, to adhere to the terms of our 
externalist thesis, Leibniz explains diversity and change by positing that monads 
do have relational properties “that express all the others, so that each monad is a 
perpetual living mirror of the universe.”54 Leibniz’ monadology conceives of 
absolute isolation in combination with total relationism, where each monad’s 
Being partially comprises an expression of the world’s totality—that is, external 
difference is premised on internal reality. Consequently, while Deleuze is clearly 
influenced by Leibniz, the fact that each monad entertains an internal relation 
with the entirety of the world leads Deleuze to reject Leibniz, as, following the 
logic of the monadology, reason is equated with representation. For Deleuze this 
is a fatal flaw and reifies the seductive pull of Platonism which he so adamantly 
resists, as “any given machine and every picture, drawing, description, or 
theorization is an irreducible entity with a private reality […] uncoupled and 
deterritorialized […] ‘extra-relational.’”55  
This is, also, precisely why Deleuze rejects the Sellarsian image of scientific 
 
51 Aristotle, “Categories” in The Complete Works of Aristotle—Volume 1, trans. and ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1991, §5, 1056a14-1668, p. 143. 
52 G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. and ed. G. di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 112-13. 
53 G.W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, The Monadology” in Philosophical Essays, trans. and ed. 
R. Ariew and D. Garber, Cambridge, MA, Hackett, 1989, p. 3, §7. 
54 Ibid., p. 8, §56. 
55 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 74. 
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realism which treats phenomena as conditioned by transcendental subjectivity; 
Sellars’ scientific image, unlike the norm-governed manifest image, is premised 
upon the elimination of all such normative notions from our descriptive and 
explanatory frameworks. For Kant, the laws of nature derive their status from 
pure understanding, which, through categorical unification, structures all that 
appears. Whereas Kantian noumena may, at first, seem to adopt to the 
externality thesis, the Kantian “thing in itself ” is not only withdrawn from 
experience but also positioned within internalism, as all entities and relations in 
human experience can be reduced to universal relations with the transcendental 
subject and its categories. The transcendental materialist path of Sellars’ 
“naturalized Kantianism” conceives of the possibility of avoiding metaphysical 
excess and skepticism without succumbing to the subjectalist temptation of 
absolutizing conditions of experience into the mechanisms of nature. For Sellars, 
sensory consciousness is the primary product of sensibility which, itself, is 
populated by sensations that are describable and that pose relations to the subject 
as modifications of statehood; they lack intentionality and must be distinguished 
from that which has intentionality (i.e., experiences and intuitions are 
composites). According to Sellars, if intuition has its own mode of productivity 
then the understanding has its own mode of receptivity because it must respond 
to “allotments” of sensibility.56 
By instrumentalizing Deleuze’s externality thesis, Kleinherenbrink attempts 
to counter Sellars’ notion that, in addition to a manifest quotidian image of 
objects, we can also attain a “scientific image” that reveals them as they are in 
and of themselves. According to the externality thesis, this conceptualization of 
difference is apparently fundamentally flawed: “[o]n the one hand, it holds that 
all entities can be reduced to a final layer of ultimate elements (false depth). On 
the other hand, it simultaneously holds that these elements conform precisely to 
our models of them (false height).”57 For Kleinherenbrink, this disharmony is 
partially due to a combination of pre-Socratism—for instance, Anaxagoras’ idea 
that everything exists in a single mass of indistinguishable yet differentiable unity, 
 
56 Wilfred Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, Atascadero, Ridgeview Publishing 
Company, 2017, p. 2. 
57 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 79. 
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or “homoiomerous” parts—and Kantianism, whereby entities are reduced to 
smaller elements but these elements and our experiences or descriptions of them 
harmoniously coincide. For Deleuze, externality demands we do away with this 
kind of difference; contra Sellars, Deleuze’s conception of indeterminacy is not 
rooted “in a dialogue between thought and nature, but in a movement that 
engages the conditions for the continuous renewal of qualitative change and that 
bridges the gap between the determinate and indeterminate states of being.”58 
Deleuze’s conception of indeterminacy is located between the “Whole as the final 
ground of being or all-encompassing horizon, and the Subject as the principle 
that converts being into being-for-us [….] all the varieties of the real and the true 
find their place in a striated mental space, from the double point of view of Being 
and the Subject, under the direction of a ‘universal method.’”59  
Accordingly, the externality thesis relies upon the irreducible machine, which, 
at its core, denies the “image or the representation slipped into the machine” that 
always results in “the compromise.”60 To think Oedipally is to cognize in 
accordance to the readily reductive image of thought, whereby thinking 
representationally involves committing entities and their relations to reduced 
relations with us.  
§ THE MACHINIC BODY 
Recall that, according to Deleuze’s philosophical system, the “actual” indicates 
assemblages as they are experienced by other machines while, conversely, the 
“virtual” denotes the extra-relational reality of machines. The fourfold system is 
the result of a further qualification resulting from the bifurcation of the 
actual/virtual with the One/multiple; as it concerns the non-relational unity of 
 
58 Peter Gaffney, The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and Philosophy, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010, p. 18. 
59 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 279. This does not seem like an entirely adequate rejoinder 
to Sellars, however, who can account for causality without theory-dependency; in fact, it elides Sellars’ 
entire critical conception of normativity. Sellars considers norm-governed behavior as causally but not 
logically reducible to regularities and dispositions. Deleuze still remains affixed to explicating indeterminacy 
via the telos of representation-cum-determinacy vis-à-vis the primacy of identity.  
60 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, “Balance Sheet Program for Desiring-machines,” Semiotext(e) is. 2, no. 
3, 1977, p. 1222. 
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what Deleuze calls “the body,” we are particularly interested in what remains 
external to relations between machines. Accordingly, “[a]s everything is a 
machine, so everything is a body.”61 We are not to understand bodies as physical, 
biological, psychic, social, or verbal machines (despite all these systems do have 
bodies) but, instead, understand that externality demands that all entities are 
formally identical in their having a body, where by “body” we mean “a 
transcendental unity, irreducible to relational dimensions such as history, 
possibilities, composition, empirical qualities, users, and functions.”62 Precisely 
due to the impossibility of full integration, these machines are “bodies without 
organs.” This guarantees that no machine can become fully integrated in any one 
relation but that every machine, instead, is a site of protest, or “anti-production.”63 
As Rancière remarks, by isolating the figure, we prevent it from becoming 
networked as an element within a circuit or serving as an idempotent and 
indexical resemblance of something else.64 
The virtual body, for Deleuze, is never pronounced in actual relations, which 
is to say that it cannot be integrated into manifestations qua relations and, 
therefore, it is the virtual that is enveloped by its relations. Despite bodies are 
irreducible to relational manifestations, these relations, nevertheless, are how 
relations transpire vis-à-vis appearance. Therefore, despite being a closed vessel, 
the virtual twofold is not immune to the evental nature of the world.65 Thus, on 
the one hand there are the “the virtuals that define the immanence of the 
transcendental field” and, on the other, “the possible forms that actualize them 
and transform them into something transcendent”66—it is, therefore, the process 
of actualization following the plane of the virtual that gives assemblages their 
particular reality.  
Deleuze also renders the “problem” or the “problematic” as the dynamic state 
 
61 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 87. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Gilles Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus, p. 19. 
64 Jacques Rancière, “Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?’ in Gilles Deleuze, une vie philosophique, ed. E. 
Alliez, Le Plessis-Robinson, Institut Synthélabo, 1998, pp. 525-536. 
65 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 97. 
66 Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life” in Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. A. Boyman, Brooklyn, Zone 
Books, 2005, p. 32. 
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of the world67—every entity is defined by “difference in kind from solutions; its 
transcendence in relation to the solutions that it engenders on the basis of its own 
determinant conditions; and its immanence in the solutions with cover it.”68 In a 
recent paper, Levi Bryant recalls Aristotle’s choice example of an acorn becoming 
a tree: within this context, the Deleuzean “problem” not only refers to the genetic 
conditions of the acorn but also all the entangled ecological relations relating to 
the an environment around it—i.e., “soil conditions, plant and animal wildlife in 
the vicinity of the seed, altitude, humidity, the amount of sunlight the seed is 
exposed to, and so on.”69 As the acorn seed integrates these singularities and their 
entangled relations, a unique “solution” is produced as the acorn generates a tree 
that is distinct from all other trees. Deviation from normalcy is how modes of 
existence articulate themselves and, conversely, how externality and the body 
without organs guarantee that a multiplicity can never be reduced to the 
circumstances that this system proffers. As an articulation of the machinic nomad, 
“lines of flight” indicate how the body exacts sufficient reason for the possibility 
of breaking with current relations (e.g., the heart’s removal, regardless of whether 
it results in an organism’s death or other hostile possibilities). The nomad is 
wrapped within a double etymology referring to dividing, distributing, and 
allotting lands but also to roaming, roving, and wandering. Thus, to be a nomad 
is to never settle within a relation, a “local absolute, an absolute that is manifested 
locally.”70 Nomadic reality transpires as a “schizo-phrenia,” an inverted 
mereotopology where private reality is prioritized over the relations between 
them.71 Therefore, the schizophrenic machine is comprised of parts and elements 
of various pre-existing machines; “the schizophrenic is a functional machine 
making use of left-over elements that no longer function in any context and that 
will enter into relation with each other precisely by having no relation.”72  
 
67 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 280. 
68 Ibid., p. 179. 
69 Levi R. Bryant, “Deleuze’s Infernal Book,” p. 12. As Bryant underscores, we should also note that 
“development is not a finalistic process for Deleuze as in the case of Aristotle, but is ongoing over the entire 
existence of the thing; the problem never ceases to change and reconfigure itself.” Ibid. 
70 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 382. 
71 Ibid., p. 34. 
72 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, p. 18. 
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In the poet Henri Michaux’s description of an alien table whose surface is 
disappearing, the “dehumanized table […] which lent itself to no function […] 
denying itself to service and communication alike,” is likened to “something 
petrified” such as a “stalled engine.”73 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze considers how 
Michaux’s table is irreducible to any creator’s intentions or to any functional 
status. Therefore, as in the mereological description, the table’s components and 
relations are simply additions and not its “Being”—that is, they remain as 
external to relations. Michaux’s unsettling table forces us to move beyond 
surfaces, recalling the body without organs as an alien table that serves as the 
instrument of unfamiliarity par excellence, resisting any mode or attempt of 
assimilation.  
§ THE EXTERNALITY THESIS: NON-CONCEPTUAL IRREDUCIBILITY & 
RELATIONS BETWEEN BODIES 
Italian philosopher and “new realism” architect Maurizio Ferraris pits Deleuze 
against postmodernist thought, which he also terms “social constructivism” or 
“realitism,” a combination of de-objectification (that there exist no “things in 
themselves,” solely human interpretations and activities), ironization, and 
desublimation. According to Ferraris, objects are unamenable—this does not mean 
that they cannot be changed but, instead, that an object cannot be reduced to its 
relation with another object. According to Ferraris, an object is as irreducible to 
a conceptual schema as it is to other objects and this is true for social objects as 
well as for physical objects. This is the fallacy of “being-knowledge,” which 
Ferraris attributes to Kant, as for Ferraris we can have meaningful intuitions 
without concepts.74 Furthermore, if any object is irreducible to how others 
currently relate to it, then it is possible to change both the object and our relations 
to it—accordingly, change and emancipation are always possible because objects 
are not restricted to their current givenness. Attributing “irrealism” to both the 
postmodern position and deconstruction, which serves as an “end in itself,” 
 
73 Henri Michaux, The Major Ordeals of the Mind, trans. R. Howard, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1974, pp. 125-127. 
74 Matteo Ferraris, Goodbye, Kant!—What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. R. Davies, Albany, 
State University of New York Press, 2013. 
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Ferraris underscores the fallacy of “ascertainment-acceptance.”75 When Ferraris 
speaks of unamendability, he does not mean that which is undetermined—the 
thesis of unamendability demonstrates that an object is not an empty void that 
passively accepts human projections. Pitting realism against postmodernism, 
Ferraris’ conception of objects is in how they resist interpretation and, therefore, 
have their own character. 
The externality thesis warrants that a machine qua body can never be 
dissolved into the schemes by which it is encountered. Deleuze’s bodies withdraw 
from becoming-present in relations, such that an entity is always irreducible to 
interpretation. Unlike Ferraris, Deleuze supplements observations—which point 
to the externality of entities, or to their unamendability—with an argument 
concerning how reality is comprised of irreducible entities. Ferraris, on the other 
hand, carves a distinction based on entities not as they exist “in themselves” but 
as they are conceptualized, setting this into opposition against how they are 
perceived. From the perspective of Deleuze’s externality thesis and the 
irreducibility of machinic bodies, Ferraris’ critique of Kant is insufficient to 
establish a realism of objects, as it “merely establishes that our experience of 
objects is a twofold of non-conceptual content supplemented by conceptual 
interpretation.”76 
Despite the externality thesis forbids direct contact between machines qua 
bodies, machines do undergo encounters through relation(s), or “syntheses.” If 
relations are external to their terms, a connection between two multiplicities 
immediately generates something that exceeds them. These syntheses neither 
concern perceptions of objects nor human experience.77 In the context of the 
machine ontology, to be what Deleuze calls a “body without organs,” a “Figure,” 
or a “problem” means to contextualize relations via neither a phenomenological 
nor an epistemological thesis. Syntheses are passive contemplations, pulling other 
(passive) entities into an (active) experience and, ontologically, all relations are 
expressed as a contraction. Therefore “every organism, in its receptive and 
 
75 Matteo Ferraris, Manifesto of New Realism, trans. S. de Sanctis, Albany, State University of New York Press, 
2014, p. 12, pp. 19-20, pp. 36-17, pp. 55-56. 
76 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 108. 
77 Ibid., p. 113. 
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perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions 
and expectations,” or protentions.78 Thus, to be a multiplicity is to assemble other 
entities via contractions, proffering difference while also contracting each entity 
in turn (through repetition); thus the “problem” corresponds to the organization 
of differential relations and singularities. As the contractive relation provides for 
a connective synthesis, Deleuze also refers to it as the “libido” or “libidinal” 
(departing from the term as it is used by Jung and Freud); the libidinal connection 
is a “contraction in which machines that remain irreducible to each other are 
combined to the extent that a third machine unifies them in its experience.”79 As 
actuality transpires in the form of indirect contact (e.g., through sense or the 
event) and is relational, manifesting in the unity of machines. “Difference” is 
comprised of the virtual being fully absent from the actual—this is precisely how 
Deleuze theorizes of the radical distinction between “corporeal things and 
incorporeal events.”80 
At this point of distinction, one may be reminded of Bergson's inverted cone 
as a dynamic representation of regressive memory, which serves as highly 
instrumental for Deleuze's portraiture of non-chronological time. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze is working within a Kantian-Bergsonian hybrid register: 
contraction is the first synthesis (the present, habit); retention is the second synthesis (the 
past, the ground of memory); expectation is the third synthesis (the future, the death 
drive, or “need”). Expectation allots how something tends towards overcoming 
its own limit.81 The disjunctive synthesis, as we will further underscore, is of a higher 
order, not easily reducible to the first, second, or third synthesis in Deleuze's 
synthesis of memory. The difference between foundation and ground is the 
difference between the present as the most contracted point of experience and 
the past as the totality of time implied in the present as a continuity between past 
and present. This recalls Kant's three syntheses of: i) apprehension (the synthesis, 
or "synopsis" of the present);82 ii) memory (recollection “of the thought object and 
 
78 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 73. 
79 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 137. 
80 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 23.  
81 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 73-74. 
82 Ibid., p. 135. 
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its recognition by a thinking subject” in the sense of the capacity to reproduce, 
i.e., the synthesis of reproduction);83 iii) final recognition (knowledge, or the 
capacity to subordinate memory under concepts).84 However, Deleuze undoes 
Kant's understanding as, for Deleuze, after memory one does not encounter 
judgment and recognition but, instead, something that breaks from 
representation, moving towards the production of the future—that is, “the 
process of prediction.”85 In place of Kantian knowledge, prediction or expectation 
facilitates Deleuze’s synthesis of the future. Deleuze removes the Kantian 
conception of understanding from being the synthetic counterpart of the 
aesthetic in representation by demonstrating how, after memory, “larval subjects” 
produce novelty via the death drive or expectation. For Deleuze, memory is the 
whole past—that is, the ground; the present is thus the foundation because it is 
the most contracted point of the Bergsonian cone of the whole past.86 More 
specifically, because the past is continuous with the present, the present is only the most 
contracted point of the past for Deleuze. Nonetheless, despite these three 
syntheses in Difference and Repetition do break with the Kantian transcendental 
syntheses, they also coincide with the tripartite Kantian framework, where Kant's 
intuition, imagination, and understanding correspond to Deleuze's sentiendum (or 
the being of the sensible), memorandum (recollection), and cogitandum (or noeteon, the 
Essence that is not yet intelligible).  
Because each entity has a body from which it encounters other beings in the 
form of contractions according to its own characteristic style of being, every 
“soul” or “larval self ” manifests according to habit. Deleuze’s first synthesis, or 
the bare fact of relation —as a synthesis of production (producing an 
actualization of whatever it contracts, engendering a togetherness)—implies that 
contraction or contemplation defines all “our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction 
times […] the presents and fatigues of which we are composed.”87 Therefore, that 
which remains eternal to terms is the virtual aspect of machines, as machines are 
 
83 Ibid., p. 191. 
84 Ibid, p. 192. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and eds. P Guyer and A Wood, Cambridge, 
UK, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
85 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 226. 
86 Ibid., p. 217. 
87 Ibid., p. 74. 
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barred from body-to-body contact; there is a private depth, soul, or body without 
organs underlying the actualizations produced by way of contraction or 
contemplation and “[e]ach relation is a synthesis by which the virtual aspect of a 
body indirectly relates to an actual manifestation of other machines, the latter 
differing in kind from their respective virtuality.”88 The contraction’s exacting 
accumulation illuminates what Deleuze (later) calls the “logic of the AND”89—
consider the following relations: the grass contracting water and nutrients in the 
soil, the cow contracting the grass, the painter contracting the cow and meadow 
into a painting, the curator contracting various paintings into an exhibition, and 
so forth.90 Occurring between fixed points and cutting across that which is 
"archaeological" and "teleological," or foundational and destinal, the transversal 
"logic of the AND" does away with static rudiments.91 The “logic of the AND” 
demonstrates how machinic contact involves the connective and contiguous 
gathering of multitudes of other machines in actualized experiences, a connective 
tissue of communication between machines that occurs at the point of the in-
between(s). 
This brings us to the question of sense, by which Deleuze neither means 
apprehension nor sensation—here, sense is caught within an identity-relation to 
the event. Both sense and the event concern themselves with the same theory of 
relations between machines. This is demonstrated by how sense is something that must 
be made to happen, which is why Deleuze uses “event” as its synonym, as when 
Deleuze remarks that “the event is sense itself.”92 Contra affect theory’s emphasis 
on perceived sensation, however, Deleuzean sense “constitutes an endless 
multiplicity of incorporeal beings”93 and exacts an impenetrable and non-
consumable frontier, facilitating a term of relations whereby the virtual (i.e., 
internal reality) is never confronted, as it remains external to all relations. Rather, 
the sense-event is an expression of the “proposition,” or empty 
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givenness/extension.94 While Deleuze’s work on sense is undoubtedly influenced 
by Spinoza—after all, sense is a result of the transition from (non-)being/virtual 
into being-for—we can also accredit Husserl’s notion of the nouma (or “real 
world,” posed against phenomena, or the perception of the world) with how sense 
is realized not as it is reduced to an object’s designation, or as that which 
experiences its expression, but, instead, as an “impassive and incorporeal entity, 
without physical or mental existence.”95 Thus, sense for Deleuze has absolutely 
nothing to do with the quality of the sensible given. As Kleinherenbrink reminds 
us, the “sense-event is not the redness, sweetness, and roundness of an apple, but 
rather the brute fact of that which is related to being the apple, which is a unified 
entity over and above its many qualities.”96 Not only is sense never expressible or 
representable, it is never equal to a function. Therefore, following Husserl’s 
“noematic service” and Émile Brehier’s conception of the “attribute,” Deleuze’s 
“sense” is purely a formal unity in actuality—an immanent function qua relation 
and purely attributed, or a “frontier.”97  
As every material object relates to a continual and endless material flow, we 
see how differentiation characterizes the “machine,” which only encounters 
partial objects.98 For Deleuze, the “partial object” is but another term for sense, 
as it manifests in and through relations, “a state of dispersion […] like the red 
clover and the bumble bee, the wasp and the orchid.”99 Accordingly, no machine 
ever encounters a void—due to the rule of contiguity and rupture, continuity of 
actuality functions as the “glue of the world,” which is simply not the case for the 
virtual.100 All entities are generated by other entities, which further generate other 
entities via encounters that are, thus, partial object-flow combinations. This is 
why Deleuze often refers to a “series,” which is any number of actual 
manifestations of machines that are organized into parts and wholes within the 
contiguous experiences of another machine. Consider, for instance, how it is the 
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observer’s position that necessarily stitches together partial-object flows or sense-
events. 
In Deleuze, the event does not necessarily designate the “sense-event”—the 
event can be designated along two planes: “real events on the level of the 
engendered solutions” and “ideal events embedded in the conditions of the 
problem.”101 Sense-events concern locality, or the plane of actuality, while “pure” 
or “ideal” events pertain to singularities, themselves, which means the virtual 
aspect of a machine-encounter. This can be opposed to Leibniz, for whom the 
“entelechy” of change come from the monad's own inner striving (i.e., 
"appetition"). In such a system, the virtual aspect of an assemblage does not 
change due to an encounter and, thus, actuality is ineffectual with regard to the 
virtual—this is precisely why, for Leibniz, the actual is barred from supervening 
upon the virtual. Unlike the monism of an unchanging ground, where the virtual 
would be trapped in its own unchanging eternity, Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis of 
becoming implies a counter-actualization, or a “becoming” of that which it was 
previously not. Ideal events are therefore productive and, unlike the shackles of 
monadology, prompt liberatory “intensities.” Therefore, "to the extent that the 
pure event is each time imprisoned forever in its actualization counter-
actualization liberates it.”102 
As Kleinherenbrink details, actuality is twofold. One on end, there is the 
“sense-event,” “extension,” the “partial object,” or the “being-comprehended” of 
the machine; on the other side, there is also the “quality,” “specificity,” or the 
“flow of a machine.” “The latter is always grafted on the former”103 and, as per 
Deleuze’s notion of “immanent transcendence,” all actuality is immanent to 
specific relations. Let us scrutinize the actuality qua human-object relations—for 
instance, consider an ordinary table, where the “actual table” is an immanent 
object of transcendence because it is inside of one’s experience. We can here draw 
a bricolage between Deleuze and Markus Gabriel’s object-domain relation, 
which (despite it does not account for the quiddity of specific functions or identity 
and change) stages a relational ontology of “fields of sense.” Consequently, there 
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is no “bare existence” but only “determined existence,” or “existence as this or 
that” wherein the "being-there of individuals or objects” is “below the threshold 
of further descriptive conditions."104 This linkage requires that we determine the 
final aspect of the fourfold, the non-relational essence that supplements each 
body and makes it ontologically different from other machines. So far, as we have 
seen, a body without organs is simply the non-relational unity of a machine. 
§ ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTION(S): ON DESIRING MACHINES AND 
HETEROGENOUS BEING 
If actualities do not figure into distinction, how do we distinguish this body 
from that body? For Deleuze, desire is what renders relational manifestations and, 
therefore, is defined in terms of power; desire is the virtual latent content 
empowering the manifest content of actuality—thus, the machine is a “desiring-
machine.”105 The machine’s desire is its private reality which cannot be directly 
experienced by anything else and is not empirically available nor is encountered 
and, therefore, is transcendental—machinic desire is what gives actuality to a 
machine without, itself, being such an actuality.106  
Desire, much like the body without organs, belongs to the virtual aspect of 
entities107 and indexes the unconscious relation of physics/physical relations 
through the aperture of internal matter. For, if the externality thesis holds, there is 
necessarily something about entities outside of such relations—i.e., an internality, 
which Deleuze defines as “[s]ubmolecular, unformed matter.”108 The virtual 
corresponds to puissance, a particular articulation of power that is non-relational 
and can be experienced and described indirectly. According to Aristotle, there is 
a distinct secondary understanding of potential equipollent to the many which is 
unique from the potential of the one; for Aristotle, “[…] so-called potentialities 
are potentialities either of acting merely or of being acted on, or of acting or being 
acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior 
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kinds of potentiality are somehow contained. Obviously, then, in a sense the 
potentiality of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be capable 
either because it can be acted on or because something else can be acted on by 
it), but in a sense the potentialities are different.”109 Just as Aristotle recognized a 
sense in which potential is one and another in which potential is many, according to 
Deleuze’s machine ontology, potential is one in the sense that it belongs to this entity 
and not to others but potential also is many, in the sense of being that which 
comprises the internal diversity of this entity while simultaneously being at the 
heart of the entire spectrum of this its actualizations.110 
Drawing from Gilbert Simondon’s notion of pre-individuality, which is 
neither reducible to chronology nor history—though not disparate from either—
and directing this study towards topological space, rather than extensive space, 
Deleuze’s interest in the virtual is in relation to the entity in-itself, or the entity as 
a meta-stable system of non-personal and a-conceptual singularities.111 For 
Simondon, it was the transductivity of different modes qua objects in relation to 
one another that allows for the exigency of a prior virtuality to be brought into 
actuality—“[f]orms are passive in so far as they represent actuality; they become 
active when they organize in relation to this ground, thereby bringing prior 
virtualities into actuality.”112 For Simondon, this process is set through the 
causality and conditioning of structures inside an associated milieu which are 
determined by and, thus, determine the other structures of a technical being, 
“but each one for its own sake, while the technical milieu, which is determined 
separately by each structure, in turn determines them altogether.”113 In this 
recurrence of causality between the associated milieu and structures, recurrence 
is, thus, asymmetrical. The associated milieu is a techno-natural milieu that 
technical objects or structures create or project upon as their own primordial 
elemental ground. This associated milieu plays the role of information, as it is the 
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bed of self-regulations; the associated milieu is homeostatic and the structures 
determined by it are animated by non-recurrent causality, where each is 
associated with singularities (i.e., “each goes in its own direction” and all 
participate within an entangled homeostatic unity, “which acts as a vehicle for 
informed energy from one to the other and among all of them”).114 Just as 
Deleuze’s second synthesis of memory is prefigured by the first synthesis of the 
present, Simondon’s notion of “ground” (fond) is prefigured by originary 
technicity, where Simondon’s “ground” corresponds “to the functions of totality 
that are independent of each application of technical gestures.”115 For Deleuze, as 
with Simondon, the individual and its individuation occur simultaneous, for “the 
individual can only be contemporaneous with its individuation.”116 
 For Simondon, a recurrence of causality is set between an associated milieu 
and structures such that homeostasis is always conditioned, just as around an 
individual there remains a pre-individual reality associated with it and enabling 
it to communicate in the institution of the collective. Similarly, for Deleuze 
singularities are pre-individual because they are populated with intensive 
singularities, code, desire, or Idea, rather than with objects of experience.117 
Specifically, when Deleuze calls this potentiality the Idea—a pure virtuality that 
does not resemble its own actualizations—it is because he is describing “the real 
with becoming actual, differentiated without being differentiated, and complete without being 
entire.”118 Due to the externality thesis, relations are external to terms and every 
machine has an excess that seeks an extra-relational “beyond”—therefore, excess 
is differentiated, as Deleuze’s system is not one of machinic univocity but one 
where every machine is a multiplicity:  
“singular without being a unit of something and diverse without being a diversity 
of things [….] Desire is the private reality of entities and in this sense [….] internal 
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reality is a machine’s matter, its substance, and its essence.”119  
Highlighting how Deleuze’s virtual is necessarily defined as a strict part of the 
real object,120 Kleinherenbrink departs from DeLanda’s assertion that Deleuze is 
not a realist about essences; indeed, Deleuze refers to desire as an essence, a 
substance, and matter.121 For Deleuze, following Husserl once more, essence 
refers not to a simple object of experience but to the body’s internal reality, 
distinct from “sensible things” and “morphological,” “nomadic” and 
“vagabond.”122  
The vagabond nature is that of the virtual’s peculiar twofold property of 
“being and not being where they are, wherever they go”123 and is explicitly 
designated because it is intensive, while an actuality is always extensive and, thus, 
articulated through precisely where and when it is, encountered in relations and 
nowhere else—“[m]y keyboard is beneath my hand and on my desk. A song is in 
a room. An organ is in an organism. Soldiers fight in wars and drones hover over 
weddings.”124 For Deleuze, the transcendental is not that of the Kantian subject 
or the Husserlian ego but understood as the virtual aspect of a machine, itself.125  
Thus, no relation, human or non-human—including perception, description, 
art, science, myth, or mathematics—can attain the complex internal distribution 
of singularities or flow of desire that is immanent to a machine. Instead, these 
relations solely produce that which “generates a machine, that which a machine 
generates, or the actual qualities that it manifests.”126 This is all to say that the 
schizophrenia of reality is that everything is a machine that has its own internal 
reality (that is, an “essence”) irreducible to its manifestations in relations, an extra-
relational non-being that is indexed by the machine’s having a body (otherwise 
termed a “problem,” “figure,” or “vessel”) with powers (“desire,” “singularities,” 
“Idea,” or “code”). Notably, while the “technical” and “social” aspect of machines 
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concerns their actuality, “desire” is “molecular” and, therefore, it is opposed to 
social and technical machines, which are “molar.” Due to the diffracted partiality 
of machinization, every machine is a “desiring-machine” in one sense, but also 
an organic, technical, or social machine in another sense, since “these are the 
same machines under determinate conditions.”127 
This is, in turn, contrary to how DeLanda’s “assemblage theory” renders 
Deleuze, for DeLanda outpouches essence and denies that assemblages are 
reducible to their parts and environments, such that entities are always external 
to their relations.128 DeLanda denies that internal essences (or the virtual) exist(s) 
while insisting upon irreducible individual entities (assemblages) that exist at all 
scales of reality. Emphasizing “dispositions,” or the fully real (albeit contingent) 
“tendencies” and “capacities” of an assemblage, DeLanda’s realist and internalist 
ontology seeks to determine how no entity can be reduced to its virtual relations 
(or “diagram”) with other beings, as the “ontological status of any assemblage, 
inorganic, organic, or social, is that of a unique, singular, historically contingent 
individual.”129 Purely nominal in difference, by “tendencies,” DeLanda means 
that which allows an assemblage to change what it is doing (e.g., water freezing 
as temperature drops) and by “capacities,” he is referring to that which allows for 
new actualization (e.g., a plant’s leaves becoming poisonous after one chews 
them).130 Antithetical to essentialism, DeLanda counters the Aristotelian 
taxonomy that essentializes species and genera as, for DeLanda, an assemblage 
is defined by the full history of all that has featured its constitution, with a species 
understood as an “individual entity as unique and singular as the organisms that 
compose it, but larger scale individual entities of which organisms are component 
parts.”131  
Kleinherenbrink argues that we should avoid reading Deleuze’s oeuvre from 
the perspective of the metaphysics proposed in Difference and Repetition, because 
Deleuze, rather than “positing supra-individual virtual structures” migrates 
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essences “into the interior of machines and shows why essence is malleable rather 
than fixed (which is his way of getting rid of ‘classical’ eternal essences).”132 For 
DeLanda, the “diagram” is never actualized and there is nothing that makes one 
“diagram” distinct from another; DeLanda’s “diagram” it is a stable virtual 
structure and, thus, there are solely sets of universal singularities determining 
possibilities. This is why, for DeLanda, there can never be bodies without organs 
and why Kleinherenbrink is justified in his charge that DeLanda conflates 
epistemological heuristics for ontological realities, inadvertently reintroducing a 
“Platonic heaven” of essences through the ideally continuous cosmic virtual plane 
that breaks into segments despite being deprived of any theory of identity or 
origination. As Kleinherenbrink notes: 
“DeLanda also claims that, for example, hunter-gatherer societies always already 
contained a prefigured state in their possibility space. But if the cosmic plane 
already contains all possibilities and if it is how the world ‘first’ begins, then why did 
everything not just come into existence from the get-go? Or why in this order and 
not in another? And why is it experiencing itself as if it is discrete identities?”133  
The phenomenologist response to DeLanda, launched by critics such as John 
Hughes and Daniel W. Smith who read Deleuze’s project as a continuation of 
Kantian and phenomenological projects, has been to respond that DeLanda’s 
account is incorrect because Deleuze is accounting for a genesis of representation 
and not the things themselves. DeLanda, who provides a rigorous 
naturalist/realist/materialist reading of Deleuze, would respond that Deleuze 
intends, in fact, to account for things themselves, regardless of whether there is 
anyone to represent them or not. For instance, the genesis of a rock takes place 
regardless of whether any living beings exist or whether anyone is there to 
represent it.134 Admittedly, DeLanda’s assemblage posits a realism for all entities 
regardless of type/scale, grants assemblages an initial real causal efficacy, roots 
assemblages in historical production (rather than transcendent structures), retains 
that assemblages have mind-independent reality, intricately accounts for the 
formation of distinct cellular and genetic processes, and regards human-object 
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relations as ontologically equal to object-object relations.135 However, in order to 
avoid conceiving of assemblages as illusory perspectives produced by and located 
on an intensive virtual realm which exists in a wholly unified and continuous 
form within a supervenient and immanent eternal present, we must rectify an 
externality thesis. This is what Deleuze’s machine ontology grants us that 
DeLanda’s internalist ontology of the assemblage does not.  
§ ON ENTITIES AFFECTING ONE ANOTHER 
 In introducing the disjunctive synthesis, which details how relations are entangled 
within “becoming,” let us recall how Deleuze notes that “[t]he first synthesis, that 
of habit, is truly the foundation of time; but we must distinguish the foundation 
from the ground.”136 As we earlier noted, contraction is the first synthesis (the 
present, habit) and memory corresponds to the past (ground, retention). Despite 
“[v]irtual objects” are “shreds of pure past”137 and are therefore non-relational, 
this does not mean that real internal singularities or properties are ascribed solely 
to the past but merely that a “power” or “Idea” is never available to the present 
for another machine. Therefore, “past” means something acting/working upon 
a relation while not entering into it and indicates that which must have been 
produced previously. 
The disjunctive synthesis comes with a forewarning: “the only danger in all 
this is that the virtual could be confused with the possible.”138 Notably, this is 
because the “possible” is that which is not yet real—the nature of the virtual 
twofold means that it is the real internal matter, or “Idea,” of an entity, which is 
fully real and therefore not possible. Thus, “the possible has no reality (although 
it may have an actuality); conversely the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses 
a reality.”139 Possibility, in being the possibility of an action, indexes another 
entity—if virtual essences were possibility, it would necessarily refer to another 
entity, which would mean it is relational, representational, internalist, and 
reducible. This is not the case, however, because Deleuze’s possibilities do not 
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demonstrate the being of things themselves, which is at the root of every 
disjunction, as the virtual essence of a machine is a cause, allowing machines the 
possibility of undergoing specific encounters/genesis. For Deleuze, essences 
function as the ground for events. 
To produce is, once more, to produce via a fourfold: the machine, with a body 
without organs and singularities, can only be encountered in terms of partial 
objects alongside qualified sense-events. This means that “being-produced” by 
other machines necessitates using other machines as parts, implicating them and 
comprehending them in turn. All contact is indirect and, while a machine 
undergoes a connection, contracting machines into an encounter, it also 
undergoes variation in its own internal matter which grounds this connection. A 
new connective synthesis is made possible between these and other machines. 
This is how the “logic of the AND” is intensified and stratified, how a body 
without organs gains and/or alters its own matter by appropriating other entities. 
Therefore, the contact of contraction is comprised of the “attraction-machine” 
which co-exists alongside the “repulsion-machine,” creating the “paranoiac 
machine”140 that eludes all other systems, prompting a circuit of co-generation 
between matter and desire. 
Because machinic fourfolds are produced by machines, an encountered 
machine partakes in the generation of the encountering machine’s capacities 
when the latter comprehends/contracts the former. In the example of a 
swimmer’s “influence” with the body of water that they are swimming in, there 
is no “connective influence” on how the swimmer experiences the water while, at 
the same time, there is a “disjunctive influence”: 
“The movement of the swimmer does not resemble that of the wave, in particular 
[....] there is no ideo-motivity, only sensory-motivity. When a body combines some 
of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it espouses the principle of a 
repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other—involves 
difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference 
through the repetitive space thereby constituted. To learn is indeed to constitute 
this space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew 
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themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself.”141 
 The virtual water does not influence the swimmer’s encounter, rather it is the 
swimmer’s “code” which determines the encounter. Nonetheless, the virtual 
(water) can influence this code by becoming one of its generators (i.e., an indirect 
disjunctive recording). In contracting the ocean’s waves into experience, they—
the water, the waves—become a part of the swimmer, and every “part” of the 
swimmer can possibly alter its singularities. This is why the waves have a “say” 
in how they are experienced by the swimmer’s body, because “[b]y contracting 
the waves of the ocean into experience they become a part of me, and any part 
of me has a shot at altering my singularities.”142  
This recalls the process of constructing a virtual object through difference 
and repetition, whereby the virtual object governs and compensates for progress 
and failure in regards to activity, as in the example of the wasp and the orchid. 
Such examples presupposes two entities encountering one another, co-
constituting each other through connective and disjunctive syntheses, chains of 
capture extracting surplus value and attraction.143 Therefore, internal chains of 
code are synthesized through the encounter as virtual content is co-determined 
during the recording process (enregistrement). As such, “the recording is an outside-
inside, an enveloping limit, ‘outside’ because it brings in a surface of exteriority 
on which the results are transcribed, ‘inside’ because it is a constitutive part of the 
machine and regulates the process of production.”144 The event is inscribed within 
the incorporeal facet of flesh and body, with connective synthesis canceling 
difference by bringing entities within a contiguous actuality and disjunctive 
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synthesis prompting material affect. As Deleuze remarks, “[w]e learn nothing 
from those who say: 'Do as I do'. Our only teachers are those who tell us to 'do 
with me', and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than 
propose gestures for us to reproduce.”145  
A third encountering machine of the other, or difference/heterogeneity, is thus 
formulated that partakes in characterizing the event. This is related to what 
Deleuze terms the procedure of “vice-diction,”146 where correlative genesis 
intervenes and conditions the determination and conditions of singularities. On 
the question of relation, thus, we can agree with Kleinherenbrink that “the 
relation between Idea and problematic body remains indirect, as there must 
always be a generator to provide the latter with the former.”147 
§ DELEUZE’S DIFFERENTIAL RELATIONS: A GRADIENT OF CHANGE 
Despite Harman often reproaches Deleuze as he is sometimes understood (that 
is, for reducing objects to a basic stratum of reality), there are arguably a number 
of similarities between Deleuze and Harman, insofar as both theorists posit all 
object-entities as the basic constituents of reality and that these entities’ 
ontological structure is comprised of a fourfold.148 Drawing from Heidegger’s tool 
analysis in Being and Time, which describes the object’s becoming a “thing” due to 
its breakage (which undergirds “thing theory),149 Harman is concerned with an 
object’s ceasing to be embedded in the context within which it normally functions 
(e.g., a broken hammer in a carpenter’s workshop). It is only after such a tool no 
longer operates within a wider system of equipment that its relations are severed 
with its wider relation, revealing an extra-relational function despite the object 
continues retaining its original ontic object-hood. Accordingly, the extra-
relational function becomes: 
“not part of our experience of objects, but of objects themselves [….] For this 
ontologization of extra-relationality, he [Harman] relies on the same argument as 
Deleuze [….] If entities are nothing but their relations to other entities, then it is 
 
145 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 23. 
146 Ibid., p. 189. 
147 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 200. 
148 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, Winchester, Zero Books, 2011, p. 107. 
149 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh, Albany, State University of New York Press. 
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unintelligible how anything can ever change as everything that anything could be 
would be exhausted in its current givenness.”150  
Consider the wholly immanent and unified object of givenness, stilted upon 
relational presence that Deleuze calls the “partial object.” Harman refers to this 
as a “Sensual Object.” There is also confluence between Harman and Deleuze 
on how change occurs as a new entity is forged from an already existing entity 
through alteration. Harman’s “vicarious causation” bars direct influence between 
entities/manifest qualities,151 just as Deleuze’s externality thesis precludes an 
encounter between the private interiors (virtual spheres) of machines. Not only 
are these manifest qualities regarded as other than the real qualities harbored by 
some private interior but, in the case of alteration or generation, if there is a 
change in an entity’s interior being it is because manifest qualities generate or 
alter existing “real qualities.” This is commensurable with Deleuze’s notion of 
disjunctive synthesis. 
Thus, both Harman and Deleuze hold that entities, among themselves, 
necessarily account for the generation of new beings, with everyday assemblages 
involved in the constitution of real qualities/singularities of new assemblages. 
However, as Kleinherenbrink prudently qualifies: 
 “Harman’s and Deleuze’s philosophies are at odds when it comes to 
their respective accounts of when change can occur. For Harman as 
for Deleuze, the dyad of real qualities (Deleuze’s singularities) and 
real object (Deleuze’s body) in an entity constitutes a malleable 
essence. Yet for Harman, the alteration of an essence due to an 
entity’s encounters with others is either drastic or nil.”152  
Unlike Deleuze’s gradient of change, for Harman alteration is a zero-sum game 
of drastic transformation or gridlock, after which change is barred. Therefore, 
Harman’s necessitarian conception of stochastic transformation is accompanied 
by a subsequent non-initial theory of immunity. Harman’s ontological argument 
for change maintains that change is only possible in a finite number of occasions 
and, in such instances, transpires in an extreme sense.  
 
150 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 201. 
151 Graham Harman, "On Vicarious Causation" in Collapse II, Urbanomic, Falmouth, 2012, pp. 171-206. 
152 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 202. 
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This brings us to the fundamental distinction between Deleuze’s machine 
ontology and Harman’s object-oriented ontology. Harman’s account of change 
seeks to refute that: 1) entities are unchangeable; 2) entities are in a constant flux 
of becoming.153 While the first step simply accounts for a theory of change, the 
second stipulation draws from Harman’s reasoning that if entities can always be 
altered to encounters, this reduces all entities to relationhood. Nonetheless, for 
Deleuze, “powers” or “singularities” are distinct in kind and type from those 
actualities generating them, which means that it is impossible to dissolve an entity 
into its relations. According to the externality thesis, rather than being 
determined by relations, it is the contingent encounter with which a machine is 
confronted with—and the manner in which current singularities resonate with 
these contingent encounters—that the force exercised by real qualities of 
surrounding entities undergoes change.  
Recall how Simondon's understanding of pre-individual funds designates an 
accumulation of factors underlying actuality's genesis. For Simondon, there is a 
"quantic" and historic element to the material combination of technical devices 
and "one grasps all at once and in actuality what is progressively constructed, 
what is slowly and successively elaborated; the idea of progress, or rather what is 
mythical about it, comes from this illusion of simultaneity, which presents as a 
fixed state what is merely a stage."154 Simondon underscores how change is not 
stochastic and a zero-sum, despite it may appear to present itself as such in how 
we illusively grasp it. Similarly, Deleuze's reworked metaphysics applies distinctly 
to variable quantities than individuals; specifically, differential relations (e.g., 
dx/dy) do not hold between individuals, but, instead, between variable quantities 
(i.e., x and y). Despite these variables may correspond to quantities of individuals, 
they can also equally correspond to velocities, spatial orientations, temperatures, 
and ranges of freedom characteristic of dynamic systems.155 
Harman does not consider how differential relations can be constitutive of the 
virtual and how this differs from causal interactions—instead, he collapses this 
 
153 Ibid., p. 204. 
154 Gilbert Simondon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, p. 122. 
155 Peter Wolfendale, Object Oriented Philosophy: The Noumenon's New Clothes, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, p. 
173. 
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distinction. As Peter Wolfendale rightly notes, Harman fails to consider the nature 
of “pre-individual relationality” and how the differential relations that Deleuze 
(and DeLanda) take to be constitutive of the virtual may differ from the relations 
or, more accurately, the causal interactions, that Harman deals with exclusively. 
That is, Harman elides engaging in the metaphysics of relations and the question 
over whether (differential) relations should be given priority over individuals by 
treating “the attractors (or singularities) that populate the vector field (or multiplicity) 
which is generated by the relevant differential relations as individuals that can be 
unproblematically separated from these relations, as if they were discrete 
components out of which the vector field was constructed, rather than 
topologically invariant features of a continuous curve.”156 Therefore, Harman 
solely preoccupies himself with the alteration of essence-change vis-à-vis whether 
causation does or does not occur. 
According to Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis, entities are endowed with a 
gradient or register of “receptivity”157 upon which traces of encounters (regarding 
internal matters of alteration) record themselves, resulting in the “change that is 
substance itself,”158 or the rhizome’s becoming. However, despite the 
misinterpretation by so-called “affect theorists,” Deleuze’s theory of becoming is 
not, in fact, localizable in sensation or that which one “feels.” Amongst other 
examples, we can see why this misconception could arise from a literal reading 
of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze writes about “becoming” 
in terms of feeling—for instance when he mentions the schizophrenic Judge 
Schreber’s “feeling” of becoming-woman.159 However, Deleuze enumerates that 
the “I feel” of becoming has nothing to do with sensible qualities,160 employing it 
as a technical concept that concerns a machine’s puissance which, being 
transcendental, is never available to human feeling or any type of direct access. 
The “I feel” of becoming is an indirect awareness of desire’s ongoing nature.161 
 
156 Ibid., p. 174. 
157 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 74. 
158 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 36. 
159 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 26, p. 141, p. 289. 
160 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands, p. 238. 
161 This is also the case in Jean-Louis Schefer’s account of “affect,” which influenced Deleuze. Schefer 
remarks that: “[f]or those new appearances – in which we must sometimes accommodate partial objects in 
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Becoming, accompanied by exact material change, is perfectly real—rather than 
imaginary—and, therefore, it is recorded. Hence, Deleuze remarks that “the 
eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also inscribed in the 
flesh.”162 For Deleuze, disjunctive synthesis is denoted by the “Numen,” the 
“energy of disjunctive inscription”163 that, in the absence of a divine will, 
omniscient God, or sovereign subject, allows entities to do the “work traditionally 
assigned to an exceptional agent.”164 According to Deleuze’s machine ontology, 
“the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of disjunctions,” as in the 
ability of a phenomena to be dissolved into its recorded elements.165 In the 
example of Judge's Schreber's delirium, Deleuze quotes Freud’s notes on 
identification being followed by division, as “[p]aranoia decomposes just as 
hysteria condenses. Or, rather paranoia resolves once more into their elements 
the products of the condensations and identifications which are effected in the 
unconscious.”166 While hysterical neurosis “comes first,” disjunctions appear “as a 
result of the projection of a more basic, primordial condensed material.”167 Thus, 
neurosis is “recorded” via the genealogies of desiring-production—i.e., “intensive 
quantities” that fluidly appear in singular events over time—rather than relapsing 
into Oedipal triangulation, which is just the domestication of intractable desiring-
content. This is precisely why Deleuze contrasts “traditional oedipalization and 
schizophrenization, the only liberating one because in the schizo there is 
something like a universal producer.”168 
However, Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis is by no means a Heraclitan thesis of 
eternal flux where everything is in constant and significant change. The virtual 
twofold of body and desire is immersed within the active unity of interior change, 
 
order to grasp them, and whose full form and reference we always misapprehend – are affects.” Jean-Louis 
Schefer, The Ordinary Man of Cinema, trans. M. Cavitch, N. Wedell, P. Grant, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 
2016, p. 210. 
162 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 161. 
163 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 24. 
164 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 207. 
165 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, pp. 24-25. 
166 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 13. Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account 
of a Case of Paranoia, trans. J Strachey, Freiburg, White Press, 2014, p. 49. 
167 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 13. 
168 Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to Michel Foucault” in Letters and Other Texts, p. 69. 
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with its unconscious “factory” immersed in the process of both being the ground 
for generation and being generated, itself.169 Consequently, considering Deleuze’s 
aforementioned gradient, there is a necessary difference in kind between 
virtuality and actuality. Therefore, any machine encounter’s “plurality of forces 
acting and being affected” occur at a “distance, distance being the differential 
element included in each force and by which each is related to others.”170 Such is 
the theory of differential heterogenesis, where the becoming of the a priori is 
linked to a mathematical description of the emergence and creation of forms. 
Beginning with Difference and Repetition, Deleuzean difference is not subordinated 
to an opposition between identity and distinctness (as in Harman’s account of 
change), which allows Deleuze to map a consistent account of heterogeneous 
continuity. Indeed, differential heterogenesis is highly related to the significance 
of differential calculus and the differential relations that it describes, wherein 
mathematical curves present the exemplary case of continuous heterogeneity, or 
difference that is not understood in terms of a prior discreteness. Without any 
need for stabilization, differential heterogenesis offers a “first referring system” 
for heterogenic flow that allows the emergence of the semiotic function from 
dynamic evolution without the need of any stabilization; as applied to fields such 
as semantics, this allows for a methodology opposite to the classical case of 
structural morphodynamics.171 Accordingly, conditions are not given, a priori, 
within a definitive set of possibilities, allowing for us to account for the historical 
variation of phase space and the set of all possible trajectories. Rather than being 
limited to mapping already possible trajectories, all machine-cum-rhizomes are 
irreducible entities where any “homogenous system” is necessarily “already affected by 
a regulated, continuous, immanent process of  variation”172 that contracts virtuality into a 
differential relation of manifestation. This relates to the virtual twofold of body 
and desire, which is always involved in an active unity of interior change, a 
product of a machine’s encounter with other machines—note, however, that 
 
169 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 90. 
170 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, 
p. 208. 
171 Alessandro Sarti, Giovanna Citti, and David Piotrowski, “Differential heterogenesis and the emergence 
of semiotic function,” Semiotica, no. 230, 2019, pp. 1-34.  
172 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 103. 
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these relations are always “at a distance” due to a difference in kind between 
virtuality and actuality. 
Returning to the distinction between technical and social machines, technical 
machines are defined extrinsically for they deal with being comprehended by 
other machines. Every machine is both technical and social—these categories 
indicate a difference in “regime” and not “kind.”173 The social machine fashions 
the memory, or reproductive process, which allows for synergy with technical 
machines. They both “point to the social machines that condition and organize 
them, but also limit and inhibit their development.”174 Social machines 
“intervene” or “repress” by contracting otherwise disparate entities together, as 
the comprehension of a machine is necessarily determined by the capacities of 
the machine “doing” the comprehending.175 In the example of a table, for 
instance, the table can be considered a social machine “for its parts,” bringing 
chairs and placements together into a functional assemblage—in this example, 
the “social machine” is predicated upon being comprehended by physical 
components that will be determined through use-value. Simultaneously, the 
table, placemats, kitchenware, and so on also comprise the “technical machine,” 
which enacts a sort of ecologization-affect, creating an enclosure or limit 
condition upon which an observer considers these all as part of a unified 
(technical) system. It is the contraction by a third machine, the human observer, 
that these two machines are brought together.  
In the event that we examine a large (macro-)multiplicity, such as a nation-
state, we can readily observe how they are “made up not only of people but also 
of wood, fields, gardens, animals, and commodities”176; similarly, “in another 
example, a cavalryman is comprised of (among other things) a man, a horse, and 
a stirrup.”177 Both the nation-state and the cavalryman are constituted within a 
temporal course of existence and a shape of “becoming” that is mostly 
determined by the social machine, which instrumentalizes such structures as a 
 
173 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 46. Gilles Deleuze et al., “Balance Sheet Program,” p. 130. 
174 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 165. 
175 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 209. 
176 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 385. 
177 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 69. 
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technical machine. Thus, as entities became functionaries of another assemblage, 
such limit conditions create boundaries and patterns of manifestations. These 
specific contingent encounters, despite their bodily irreducibility and excessive 
desire, bar assemblages from either connecting, contracting, or retaining relations 
arbitrarily. It is, in fact, the trace or “code” that remains in minor machines that, 
after contractions or retentions, continue to function. Because actuality is 
contiguous and denies full integration, or being-for-the-other, actual presents are 
consolidated contracts metamorphizing into pure pasts that are distinct in kind 
from those presents, permeated by an “active forgetting.”178 Therefore, this 
genealogical process of forgetfulness is a fundamental feature of reality which 
guarantees that “becoming is an antimemory.”179 Thoroughly relational, the history of 
any entity is a record of how other assemblages manifest according to it and how 
the machine transpires according to others—becoming “cannot be reduced to 
anything that has become” just as “[b]ecoming is not what it becomes.”180 
Becoming is a “transmutation”181 where the contraction of actual presentations is 
transferred into virtual content—this is why we never have visible access to seeing 
the manifest relation in itself, because “everything changes in nature as it climbs 
to the surface.”182 Contra relationism, where radically new entities supervene 
upon any new spatio-temporal moment, Deleuze’s machine ontology designates 
change in nature as reiterating how actualized virtuality or contracted actuality 
designates that a source never resembles its result.183 
 
178 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 55. 
179 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 294. 
180 Gilles Deleuze, What is Grounding?, trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Grand Rapids, &&& Publishing, 2015, 
pp. 82-83. 
181 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 8. 
182 Ibid., p. 175. 
183 This is by no means to suggest that becoming can escape from the Spinozist determinism that Deleuze 
inherits. On the contrary, every body is “born not only of determined elements […] it is born into a 
determined setting, which is like a mother suited for its reproduction.” Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 272. 
This setting is a milieu that Deleuze frequently refers to as a “dark precursor” because these determinations 
are absent from the sense-events that it creates and from the machines that spring forth through 
conjunction, which we will further detail. For Deleuze, the production of any relation “affirms necessity” 
and combines all elements of chance. While Deleuze describes the sense-event’s actualizations as “aleatory,” 
this is simply due to its virtual properties, which do not imply specific actualities and differ from their 
manifestations/causal schema. Where a point of contact may be “aleatory” between two machines, the 
third machine ungrounds the two former machines through the synthesis of conjunction.  
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Intensity designates the internal matter of multiplicities. According to the 
externality thesis, we ought not conflate the ontological structure of entities with 
existential challenges—“[p]recisely because of ontological equality, things are 
unequal in their existence.”184 This existential difference, a pure difference, is why 
Deleuze attributes intensities with indivisibility and the puissance of an entity. 
Much like singularities, Deleuze terms intensities as “not the sensible but the 
being of the sensible.”185 Detailing how intensity becomes individuated and 
actualized into the forms of space and time without relapsing into idealism, 
Deleuze re-inscribes Bergson’s metaphysics of becoming in the context of a 
reworked transcendental philosophy. Thus emerges an empiricist inversion of 
Kant’s account of synthesis and the faculties, in which the aesthetic and cognitive 
powers of the subject become the engines of ontogenesis, directly generating these 
forms of space and time. Because intensities are always transcendental and virtual 
entities—“whether or not one machine manages to alter another depends on the 
intensity of their encounter”186—they are enveloped by extensity, which is 
divisible and is expressed in “basic spatio-temporal dynamisms.”187  
We have described the “tetravalence of the assemblage,”188 including: 1) the 
body (“Figure,” “problem,” “plane of consistency”); 2) desire (“code,” “puissance,” 
“powers,” “potential,” “Idea,” “singularities”); 3) sense (“sense-event,” “partial 
object”); 4) qualities (“flow”). We have also described the twofold virtual essence 
formed through the body and its desire alongside the “sense-event” and its 
qualities, which form the twofold actual manifestation. 
 Through the connective synthesis (“habit,” “contemplation,” “contraction,” 
“production”) we have described a relation—the combination of rupture and 
continuity—that brings irreconcilable machines together within the “actual 
plane” of existence vis-à-vis other machines. In addition to the connective synthesis 
we have also detailed the disjunctive synthesis (“recording,” “registration,” 
 
184 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 215. 
185 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 267. 
186 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 215. 
187 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 245. Since different entities have different “Ideas” not every 
machine can connect to others and not all machines can undergo all encounters; in turn, not every machine 
can register the existence of others, and so on.  
188 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 89. 
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“inscription) which illuminates that which a relation is determined by or rooted 
in—that is, the essence of the assemblage, an internal matter of a machine that is 
malleable and undergoing inscription and registration due to the contraction of 
other entities.189  
Having detailed both the connective synthesis and the disjunctive synthesis, we are 
now left with a quandary—the absence of an externalized media-relation. 
Despite adamantly dispelling any possibility of dualism between social and 
technical machines, it may, indeed, appear that Deleuze seems to retain the 
dualism between machines and relations, which betrays the prime insight of the 
machine ontology (i.e., that everything is a machine). This void is the product of 
our not yet having elucidated the medium of the machine encounter. We have 
traversed Deleuze’s literature to note that relations are machines that spring forth 
“veritable external bridges,”190 but what of the media produced through relations, 
the mobilized and detached product(s) of such relations? Deleuze notes that 
“[c]reation’s all about mediators” and that “[w]ithout them nothing happens.”191 
 
189 It is perhaps quite fair to say that Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis is often over-designated as the fruit of 
his system. This is, in fact, what Badiou’s book on Deleuze claims, as for Badiou the disjunctive synthesis 
lays claim to how relations work. According to Badiou, relations are rooted in a universal and open Whole 
that reintroduces a universal one. The eternal return is understood as the formal law posed on chaos; the 
universe thus being an outcome of the struggle between dissolution and return, where Being is prodded 
forth via conjunction and dissolution: “[t]he reascent of the virtual would be the return, or the engagement 
of the One in the simulacra or beings, while the beings themselves, in their subjection to the disjunctive 
synthesis, would signify heterogeneity and dissolution.” Alain Badiou, Deleuze—The Clamor of Being, trans. L. 
Burchill, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 68. Unlike Deleuze’s conjunctive synthesis by way 
of disjunction, Laruellean idempotence attempts a “media-without-mediation”; as Anthony Paul Smith 
remarks, this is a generic determination “without synthesis – between the One and the Multiple that is 
developed in this non-philosophical unified theory of philosophy and quantum mechanics.” Anthony Paul 
Smith, Laruelle: a Stranger Thought, Cambridge, UK, Polity, 2016, p. 164. Notably, as Kleinherenbrink 
recovers through his close reading, Deleuze’s system is predicated upon the externality thesis and, therefore, 
the conjunctive synthesis, which produces externality. Also notable is the remark that “[t]o even begin 
answering the question for any given body or bodies always involves non-philosophy, and even then we are 
only ever categorizing and examining signs of machines in order to construct maps of their being. This 
would be the process of determining ‘who? how? how much? where and when? in which case.’” Arjen 
Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 282. Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands, p. 96. In Kleinherenbrink’s remark, 
the inner being of things is understood through an outside, a distinction that well describes the process of 
antecedent determination in Laruelle’s non-philosophical system of:  
(immanent real) Identity(theoretical/scientific) real objectobject of knowledge 
190 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands, p. 163. 
191 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 125. 
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This necessarily means that we need a third synthesis, a conjunctive synthesis. 
§ THE PRODUCTION OF RECORDING: THE CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS 
If the first synthesis of connection creates a “foundation” and the second synthesis 
of disjunction designates a “Ground,”192 the third synthesis of conjunction 
producing an ungrounding through compounding the first two “for itself.”193 The 
third synthesis is therefore one of “consumption,” “consummation,” “residue”194 
and does not “refer to the becoming of the machines forming the terms of the 
relation, as that concerns the second disjunctive synthesis of recording. Instead, 
it refers to the genesis of a new machine altogether, which from then on can 
engage in its own connections and becomings.”195  
Calling forth our opening remarks surveying theories of autopoiesis and 
positive feedback, we can substantively know how the conjunctive synthesis is a 
recursive function that creates a positive informational feedback loop based upon 
adequation via environmental complexity. As Deleuze remarks: 
“[m]an is a component part of the machine, or combines with something else to 
constitute a machine. The other thing can be a tool, or even an animal, or other 
men. We are not using a metaphor however when we speak of machines: man 
constitutes a machine as soon as this nature is communicated by recurrence to the 
ensemble of which he forms a part under given specific conditions [….] Men form 
a labor machine under the bureaucratic conditions of the great empires. The Greek 
foot-solider together with his arms constitute a machine under the conditions of the 
phalanx. The dancer combines with the floor to compose a machine under the 
perilous conditions of love and death.”196 
We can see this detachment from the immediate production of actuality as 
giving rise to a new nomadic machine in many instances. For example, 
“whenever someone makes love […] that person constitutes a body without 
organs, alone and with the other person or people.”197 Every synthesis necessitates 
two former syntheses, and every connection invariably involves the “eternal 
 
192 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 79. 
193 Gilles Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus, p. 28. 
194 Ibid., p. 103, p. 28. 
195 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 225. 
196 Gilles Deleuze et al., Balance Sheet Program, pp. 117-118. 
197 Gilles Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 30. 
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return’s” production of a non-productive, irreducible body without organs 
undergoing virtual becoming. Deleuze at times calls this residual entity a 
“celibate machine”198 which delegates the birth of every conjunctive machine, 
wrapped up in autonomy and novelty, “new with regard to the machines that 
initially produced it”199 due to its being bound by “neutrality and genetic 
power.”200 By “forming a new alliance between the desiring-machines and the 
body without organs so as to give birth to a new humanity or a glorious 
organism,”201 the “celibate machine” is a producer of intensive qualities. 
The conjunctive synthesis is a mereological function where the parts 
overdetermine the whole, for the machine ontology is nothing but pluralism in 
the last instance. Therefore, Deleuze emphasizes “the unconditioned character 
of the product in relation to its production, and the independence of the work in 
relation to its author or actor.”202 In contrast to the obfuscatory motor force of 
capitalist “value theory” that relates empirical phenomena, or economic 
dynamics, back to a fundamental principle of synthesis via equalization, Deleuze 
acknowledges the celibacy of machines to both “[a]ccept the event” and how “it 
contains in itself something incorporeal.”203 This is a theory of the scar, the 
wound’s residue, whereby, despite “‘[m]y wound existed before me, I am born to 
embody it.’ That is to say, yes, it is effected in myself, but it contains something 
by which it isn’t anymore ‘my’ wound.”204 This residual energy is what facilitates 
the further becoming of the new machine, a product of conjunctive synthesis of 
the “unconscious”205 that has a residual energy driving it forwards. There is, 
therefore, a critical reflective facet in the constituting of conjunctive synthesis, as 
“the celibate machine first of all reveals the existence of a much older paranoiac 
machine”206 rather than erasing its primacy. 
 
198 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 29. 
199 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity, p. 226. 
200 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 123. 
201 Gilles Deleuze et al., Anti-Oedipus, p. 17. 
202 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 92. 
203 Gilles Deleuze, “Seminars on Capitalism and Schizophrenia,” http://www.webdeleuze.com/ and 
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Here we have an answer to the previous problem concerning mediation, as 
the third machine functions as a “veritable external bridge”207 and conjuncts that 
which is properly intra-relational, forging relations within or through machines 
instead of posting a universal background or open Whole. At this point it may 
tempt the reader to claim that the conjunctive synthesis repeats the logic of the 
connective synthesis, which implies rupture and contiguity through forces of “habit, 
connection, and contraction.”208 However, the conjunctive synthesis is unique 
from the connective synthesis, as the former concerns “that which must be 
generated (a celibate machine) during the connection with other machines (partial 
objects, sense-events) in order for the encounter to last.”209  
This is not to concede to the revolutionary necessity of connection, or 
“conjugation,” which “plugs or seals the lines of flight” as it “performs a general 
reterritorialization.”210 Excessive desire, or surplus, is actualized through specific 
relations and nowhere is this clearer than the becoming-marketable of once anti-
capitalist efforts—consider, for instance, how ecological efforts are often 
subsumed by postindustrial alternative energy efforts vis-à-vis neoliberal 
corporate motives. The virtual being of a machine can never be exhaustively 
deployed in a single relation and, thus, there is always the possibility for other 
entities to intervene. A system functions “so long as the surface holds” and there 
is “nothing more fragile that the surface,” which is prone to “being overturned in 
a terrible primary order.”211  
In his 1990 “Postscript to Societies of Control,” Deleuze describes the 
mereological “dividual” and control power’s teleological “dividualization,” a 
processes of quantum axiomatization, non-coercive modulation, and numerical 
diffraction that renders the individual, as a an indissoluble whole and total 
assemblage, to be of less interest to Capital that their aggregate composition.212 
This is evidenced today in metadata analysis, derivative markets, or actuarial 
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finance capitalism’s techniques of predictive recombination, wherein neoliberal 
control is not excised by a central power but decentralized war machines—under 
control society, subjects are partialized, designated as score-able and rank-able. 
Stratification is eliminated by control power which, given faster computing 
speeds and processing power, is increasingly veering more and more towards 
automatization and algorithmic governmentality. Following Deleuze, Bernard 
Stiegler terms this development under our hyper-industrial epoch “hyper-
control,” wherein “fragility” is generated by “self-produced personal data, self-
collected and self-published by people themselves—whether knowingly or 
otherwise—and exploited by applying high-performance computing to these 
massive data sets.”213 Nonetheless, following Deleuze’s account, the suppleness of 
micropolitics is pharmacological, allowing for new emancipatory possibilities and 
new repressions, or limit-conditions. Thus, Deleuze’s remark that in production 
there is always something that “diverts,”214 allowing the immediate generation of 
a new machine that cannot be reduced to its generators. 
In describing compossibility and/or incompossibility, Deleuze designates 
each machine with its “own specific Idea in variation […] a given machine will 
not be able to even register the existence of the vast majority of other 
machines.”215 Incompossibility can be “practical” when it relates to the observable 
limit conditions or substances of this world (e.g., a would-be patron is forbidden 
from entering a particular establishment due to specific conditions such as 
ongoing construction or maintenance). Such limit conditions can also be 
“essential” when we, as observers, do not have the puissance “to be somewhere or 
encounter something” (e.g., observing dark matter, which we know exists but are 
unable to encounter/observe until we construct the proper machines).216  
This conjunctive relation is a differential relation because it cannot be reduced 
to its manifestation; for instance, “[w]ater is a differential relation with regard to 
its hydrogen and oxygen, nations are differential relations with regard to their 
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laws and citizens, a love is a differential relation with regard to its lovers, and so 
forth.”217 A Figure is distinct from its code because within the virtual half of the 
machine is the non-productive facet, distinct from desire’s productive and causal 
multiplicity. Accordingly, generation is produced through other machines and 
therefore is relational—the variations and becomings of an Idea are by no means 
a matter of puissance.  
Is this processual irreducibility necessarily always differential? Tristan Garcia, 
much like Deleuze, is a process-philosopher and his work will help clarify this 
distinction. While, for Deleuze, the third synthesis of conjunction shows how a 
machine is always more than its parts and/or environments (because it cannot be 
reduced to its generators), according to Garcia’s two-sided ontology it is always 
less. Let us call to mind, once again, the necessary disparity between ontological 
status and existential status in Deleuze’s machine ontology: every machine is 
equal within Deleuze’s flat ontology qua the fourfold of body, Idea, partial 
object(s), and qualities while machines, existentially (which Garcia calls 
“objectively”), are produced through specific puissance and vary in their 
actualizations relative to other specific machines. Similarly, Garcia’s ontology 
“[c]aptures entities in their formal being on the one hand and their objective being 
on the other.”218 However, for Deleuze qualities are not machines but 
actualizations of a machine—for instance, the color “red” is not a machine in 
itself but an actualization. For Garcia, “red” is granted the same ontological 
parity as the machine that actualizes it and is, therefore, also a machine.  
Under the rubric of “compactness,” Garcia rejects all varieties of 
substantiality or essence—for Garcia, to endow reality with any kind of positive 
and self-adequate content means to constitute it with being both a whole and the 
component of that whole, resulting in a logical paradox.219 For Garcia, properties 
play perhaps the most critical role in respect to determining an object’s unity. 
Such is Garcia’s processual comprehension of “de-determination,” the grasping 
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of machines in their irreducibility through a formal plane of reference.220 For 
instance, an observer de-determines a tree by abstracting it from its components, 
its environment, its properties, its past, and its future. As a machine ontology that, 
contra Deleuze’s distinction between machines and their actualizations, removes 
all actuality pertaining to an entity, Garcia’s system of being generates an entity 
alongside “everything that an entity manifests to others.”221 The tree is therefore 
left de-determined and reducible to itself, by which we mean it is not reduced 
into pure “nothingness” and, simultaneously, not reduced into “natural, social, or 
historical” referents.222 Unlike Deleuze, Garcia does not attribute such solitary 
“machines” as having any real being “in itself.” For Garcia, ontological status is 
produced negatively and is irreducible, a byproduct of the “difference between that 
which is in this thing and that in which this thing is” or the “difference between […] 
content and container.”223 What Garcia calls “form” is the outline of an object’s 
inclusion in a comprehension-system, the point where “something else takes 
over” and frames the machine. Thus, “objecthood” compliments “form.” 
Garcia remarks that “things that enter into another thing, which in one way 
or another comprehends them, we call ‘objects’”224 and takes us one step further 
than Gabriel’s ontology of the infinite deferral of specification. For Garcia, any 
particular entity is not “nothing” for it is irreducible to all that composes it (e.g., 
atoms, sensations, thoughts, etc.) and what it features in (e.g., an apartment room, 
building, neighborhood, and so on). Rather than having any features “in and of 
itself,” an entity is characterized through the pure difference between its 
composite make-up—or its components—and its referential background, or that 
in which it features. What this demonstrates is that there is no necessary 
composition for an object but pure relation-hood, or “intensities. ”Garcia remarks 
that, “[l]ike a reflection on the surface of water, a tree that is identical to itself is 
nothing but an effect of the profound reality of that which is, continuous 
variations of being, lines of becoming that momentarily appear like stable objects 
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in space.”225 
Via Garcia’s absolutely negative characterization, we can better understand 
how Deleuzean difference is conclusively positive—a machine is always more than 
its generators and generations because it has a complex private and interior 
“being” that comprises what Deleuze calls “powers,” “singularities,” or “Idea.”226 
Kleinherenbrink’s critique is that, while for Deleuze there is a difference within 
entities—between their virtual properties and their actual manifestations to other 
entities—Garcia’s entities “lack any properties that would constitute a sufficient 
reason for why this entity differentiates like this and that entity differentiates like that 
[…] any and all specification and characterization dissolves into an indefinite 
chain of references to components that are in things […] without ever stumbling 
upon something that actually has features.”227 More precisely, Garcia’s system lacks 
a theory of translation or scalar hierarchy due to its infinite deferrals of 
specification, which Deleuze systematically accounts for rather robustly. For 
Deleuze, machines can have actualizations that are not themselves machines but 
instead translations or scalar measurements of the being of a machine, contracting 
these into the experiential content of another machine. This serves as a critical 
moment to more closely observe Deleuze’s rhizome and the relationship between 
the whole to parts. 
§ ON REDUNDANCY, FRAGILITY, RESISTANCE 
Due to its mereological—or differential—heterogenesis, every machinic relation 
is excessive, as it is characterized by internal difference between virtuality and 
actuality. Composed of connection-registrations, residue is additive and therefore 
produces new machines through the threefold synthesis which transpires as: 1) 
Libido, a “withdrawal-energy” that delineates how a qualified sense-event 
transpires for a machine; 2) Numen, a “detachment-energy” which relays how this 
machinic encounter differentiates the puissance upon which the machinic relation 
was initially drafted; 3) Voluptas, the “residual energy” of becoming, or the 
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“genesis” of a new irreducible machine.228 Accordingly, these three modes:  
“make the process of desiring-production at once the production of production, the 
production of recording, and the production of consumption. To withdraw a part 
from the whole, to detach, to ‘have something left over,’ is to produce, and to carry 
out real operations of desire in the material world.”229 
Further stratifying the principles of rhizomes, Deleuze enumerates: 1) the 
“principle of connection” where “any point of a rhizome can be connected to 
anything other, and must be” (e.g., semiotic chains, regimes of powers);230 2) the 
“principle of heterogeneity,” whereby a rhizome is irreducible to its 
multiplicities;231 3) the “principle of multiplicity,” which dictates substantive 
difference between the machine’s being a unified “body without organs” and 
differentiated in its singularities, open to becoming;232 4) the “principle of 
asignifying rupture,” according to which actualizations are ruptures unique from 
their desire;233 5) the “principle of cartography,”234 according to which a map 
constructs an unconscious that exceeds its territory (this is perhaps most clear in 
pedagogue Fernand Deligny’s lignes d’erre, or wander-lines)235; 6) the principle of 
“decalcomania,”236 which emphasizes how encounters can always instigate novel 
inscriptions of desire on its virtual body.237 
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Each generating part of a rhizome is, in turn, a rhizome generated from non-
resembling parts “[d]ividing endlessly” where “[m]atter thus offers an infinitely 
porous, spongy or cavernous texture without emptiness, caverns endlessly 
contained in other caverns: no matter how small, each body contains a world 
with irregular passages.”238 Because the essence of any machine is open to 
variation prompted by an encounter, the encounter can be subsumed within a 
machine’s tendrils; this is how all relations lead to and index the transcendental, 
or “intensive,” heart of a machine. For example, the “code” or being of a child is 
not only determined through social or familial conditions but all (rhizomatic) 
encounters, including “bread, money, dwelling place, social promotion, 
bourgeois and revolutionary values, wealth and poverty, oppression and revolt, 
social classes, political events, metaphysical and collective problems.”239 As a 
“teratology,”240 Deleuze’s philosophy emphasizes how individual essence is 
regulated by a process of progressive individuations and always constructed from 
infinite (differential) heterogenous sources with multiple entrances, each 
ontologically equal. Rhizomes are therefore not exclusively composed of other 
rhizomes. As is the case for Lucretius, with rhizomes “there is no body composed 
of homogenous parts.”241 Instead, rhizomes underscore the open nature of the 
whole and its being irreducibly constituted by machines with parts that are 
irreducibly composed of other machines.  
While Meillassoux’s reality as hyper-contingency provokes that “[e]verything 
could collapse […] by virtue of the absence of any superior law capable of 
preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing,”242 for Deleuze puissance can 
solely be overcome by other machines. Therefore, “[n]o tree disappears without 
a fire burning it, terminates consuming it, or thunderbolts detonating it into a 
swarm of splinters.”243 This is why, in opposition to both Meillassoux’s hyper-
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contingency and Leibniz’s incommensurability (qua a superior entity, i.e., God), 
Deleuze is a thinker of absolute actuality. Deleuze accounts for machinic desire, 
which not only limits how machines can encounter one-another but also prevents 
Garcian redundancy. Because machines can, themselves, constitute territories 
that underscore certain features, “there is still hierarchy and distribution in 
univocal being.”244 Stable patterns of production and behavior emerge—
symbiosis, for instance, allows for machines to become what DeLanda describes 
as “contingently obligatory.”245 This is how strata lock singularities into acts of 
capture, producing “systems of resonance and redundancy” and forming “molar 
aggregates”246 that stratify specific regional ontologies within fourfold being and 
threefold synthesis.247 
§ THE POWER OF THOUGHT: HUMAN ALL TOO MACHINE 
How does Deleuze’s thought concern the human, which it would evidently 
appear to never privilege beyond the machinic tyranny of scales and conjunctive 
synthesis? Deleuze’s machine ontology accords a method of his “transcendental 
empiricism.” This system begins with a recollection of the Kantian “boundary 
concept” of rationality’s regulative use; according to Deleuze’s account of 
“empiricism,” human finitude designates encounters as a sign or manifestation of 
other entities and not such entities in and of themselves. The “transcendental” 
portion is what manages us to assume that there is also a virtual side to machines, 
which can allow us to move beyond this pretention of negative use. In his early 
account of “transcendental empiricism,” Deleuze’s materialist transvaluation of 
the Kantian account of transcendental subjectivity imparts how impersonal, 
inhuman thinking does not merely represent the natural world but is directly 
productive of forms (e.g., space and time). As Deleuze’s system matures, it further 
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accounts for a supplementary account of subjectification, wherein an appeal to 
the “encounter” ensures the “measure of fit” between transcendental empiricism 
as a constructivist mathematism of concepts and the world of intensive, actual 
difference. 
It is the unconscious of a machine that comprises our “real subject,” whereas 
that with we identify ourselves with (e.g., “male,” “female,” “non-binary,” 
“Turkish,” “French,” “writer,” etc.) is the marker of excess and overflow. We are 
apparent “residual” subjects kept intact through other machines248—we cannot 
commit a single act without conspiring, veritably mobilizing and collapsing 
within an infinity of such machines. This is the nature of our “double freedom”: 
we can never be reduced to or totally integrated within the machines that 
produce us and, simultaneously, we cannot be fully reduced to that which we 
produce or create. Is the marker of the human that we are conscious of these 
processes and the irreducibility we share with existing multiplicities? 
Consolidating the confrontation of materialism and idealism so as to overcome 
the duality of image and movement, consciousness and being, Deleuze remarks 
that “all consciousness is consciousness of  something (Husserl), or more strongly: 
all consciousness is something (Bergson).”249  
What Deleuze ascribes to Bergson is that, due to the externality of relations 
to term, being conscious of machinic processes—as a further relation-cum-
irreducible machine—merely implicates us in the third conjugation (through 
consciousness). Everything is not internal to space and time—instead, the 
externality thesis holds that space and time are local phenomena rooted in 
machines, themselves.250 Space relates to the singularities of machine251 but there 
are two kinds of space: the transcendental “smooth” space of machinic 
singularities, and the actual “striated space” of actual manifestations.252 Sense-
events constitute the striated world but striations do not correspond to the smooth spaces that 
underly them. Therefore, not all machines are part of all spaces and “things” are 
never located in space in general but always in other machines. All machines are 
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together in other machines and never “somewhere in general.”253 This is the 
ultimate lesson we learn from rhizomes—a lesson of immanence. 
Time is also bifurcated into “Chronos,” and “Aion,” with “reciprocal 
exclusion” between the two.254 As the time of measure, “Chronos” concerns the 
contiguous flow of actual encounters that a machine undergoes—how machines 
exist for other assemblages in their being translated and mixed into actuality. 
Such is the cypher of the return, the repetitive logic of “the Same” that designates 
how no machine can go beyond registering other entities on its own terms.255 
“Aion,” on the other hand, is that which “can only be thought,”256 the time of 
counter-actualization and relations escaping the present by dividing what appears 
into “an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-there, a simultaneous too-
late and too-early.”257  
Returning to our initial comments on a super-organological universe, an all-
encompassing Gaia, the following question becomes necessary—if we are merely 
machines and an individual is “always in a world as a circle of convergence,”258 
must it logically follow that there must be one totalizing reality? Deleuze’s 
machine ontology “posits one reality in the precise sense that all machines and 
their singularities are generated from local outsides, which is to say other machines 
with their own irreducible and withdrawn virtual aspect, but never from a total 
outside, which is to say something transcending machinic being.”259 Does this 
mean there is “mechano-sphere” in the sense of a machine system that 
encompasses the totality of all bodies without organs, a Universal abstract 
machine? Deleuze gives us two different answers, at times confirming this thesis260 
and elsewhere noting that a plurality of existing abstract machines presents a 
diagram-assemblage.261 Perhaps to more definitively answer this we can glean a 
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clue from the following state: “there is no abstract machine, or machines, in the 
sense of a Platonic Idea, transcendent, universal, eternal. Abstract machines 
operate within concrete assemblages.”262 Deleuze’s “mechano-spere” cannot 
violate the externality thesis, meaning that it is still a part among parts—if there 
is to be any unity, it is a “chaosmos and no longer a world.”263  
An unlikely thinker, Bruno Latour, similarly approaches reality as comprised 
of irreducible entities and mutual associations, where we lack a final layer and/or 
primordial source to tether concrete existents to. Latour, of course, is well aware 
of the similarity between actor-network theory and Deleuze’s machine ontology, 
as Latour notes that his system could be termed an “actant-rhizome ontology.”264 
Latour’s principle of irreducibility emphasizes the contingent labor of actants, 
none of whom are ordained metaphysical hierarchy. Prompting a “reduction,” 
(hybrid) actants combine into networks, where the network is not ontologically 
separable from the actants,265 just as in Deleuze’s machines and rhizomes. 
Kleinherenbrink prudently notes that “Deleuze’s machine ontology would define 
a city as both a machine and a rhizome: a machine because of its irreducibility 
and a rhizome because it is generated by countless other machines. For the same 
reason, a city for Latour is both an actant and a network of actants.”266 Following 
Latour’s account of being, to define an entity is to observe it alongside what it does, 
registering it in the act of translation, a functional appeal—all that exists is actants 
and their associations, without a priori suppositions (just as in Deleuze’s 
“transcendental empiricism”). 
Nonetheless, one fundamental reality allots for distinct political possibilities 
between Deleuze and Latour. For Latour, our tendency to reduce domains into 
either “natural” passive executors of mechanistic natural laws or “cultural” 
entities that reduce all possibilities into sovereign human freedom is the project 
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of modernity and, therefore, rooted in a historical event.267 For Deleuze, such 
reductionist thinking is never the product of a historical event but the 
consequence of paralogisms, an error of thought that is produced by the 
ontological appearance, or ontic status, engendered by machines. The image of 
thought is treated as a surface-effect and, therefore, Deleuze is concerned with 
the representational nature of thinking, unlike Latour whose interests are 
embedded within historical contingencies. As it relates to the organism’s 
operating under such paralogisms, the unification and totalization of this 
connective synthesis is production via a psychological register, organizing the 
body into its organism-form. This means that the body’s desires and its capacities 
to socially recognize, as well as the work of social reproduction, are necessarily 
interwoven within Deleuze’s political treatment of machine ontology. Latour, on 
the other hand, is able to index historical rifts and avoid the machinic (or, in 
Latourian semblance, “networked”) necessity of dualyzed overcoding. This also 
is precisely why the Deleuzian machine necessarily produces images without 
resemblance, finding itself at odds with Platonism, where the copy is an image 
with resemblance. For Deleuze, all resemblances that exist are merely productions 
between machines instead of (Platonic) predetermined identities. Resemblances are 
simulacra, retaining a difference in kind between “what they are in their virtual 
becoming” and that which they “manifest to others,” i.e., the machinic becoming 
of actuality and appearance.268  
§ OVERTURNING PLATONISM & THINGS IN THEMSELVES 
If Platonism, from Badiou’s millenarian Platonism to Reza Negarestani’s 
neorational Platonism, is the doctrine that the being of some or all entities is 
secondary, it is because principles, truths or essences are found in a “something 
else” which we can engage with through interaction. Insofar as involves primary 
entities, only the Eternal Form can possess the ontological access of being one 
with these primary entities. Therefore, Platonism is an internalism, defined not 
by the “extrinsic relation to an object” which, following Kleinherenbrink, we 
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have called the “externality thesis,” but by “an intrinsic relation to the model or 
foundation.”269 Deleuze’s machine ontology inverts this idea and seeks to replace 
the “Idea as the goal of reminiscence” and, therefore, the Platonic “stable 
Essence” by reorienting Ideas as they are conceived of by a subject, utilizing 
“qualitative transition” and “mutual fusion.”270 To “overturn Platonism”271 
necessitates removing all traces of “full presence,” “reductionism,” and 
“relationism” by liquidating stable and eternal “general essences,” replacing them 
with individual and malleable distributions capable of forming singularities.272 
Accordingly, “the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer by anything other than an 
‘effect,’”273 where bodies and their virtual content become the cause of what 
transpires—“[a]ctual qualities, such as being just are no longer references to 
eternal forms, but hallmarks of the sterile surfaces of neutral-sense-events.”274  
Platonist internalism slips into the “paralogism of extrapolation”275 for 
Deleuze. By thinking of the virtual in terms of the actual and the ontological in 
terms of the existential, we erroneously conceive of the transcendental is terms of 
the empirical. Recall how in the machine ontology, any relation is a connection 
with a partial and non-specific object.276 An actual sense-event is distinct in kind from 
the virtual being of the machine, of which it is merely a manifestation. Therefore, 
following Deleuze, any concept, quality, or “membership” attributed to an 
assemblage point irradiates not the Idea, in itself, but the translation of desire 
within a technical machine for a larger, subsumptive circuit—the social machine. 
This is why the relational being is not simply “partial” but also “non-specific”; 
according to the paralogism of extrapolation, we extend the category of being 
qua an entity towards greater categorical belonging. That is, we take an assigned 
quality, concept, or membership to accurately express the being of another 
machine, and “what is apprehended when we touch the surface of the object is 
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perceived as residing in its innermost depth.”277 This is why the “paralogism of 
extrapolation” gives rise to impossible standards, giving precedence to the 
assumption that “real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that 
integrate it, subject to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and 
cultural production.”278 If any “extrapolated X” is simultaneously posited as the 
being of an individual and that which an individual always lacks, then the quality, 
concept, or membership of is transmogrified into a “despotic signifier.”279 
There is also a second paralogism, that of the “double-bind,” which concerns 
Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis of recording.280 This involves one specific 
pathology dominating all ordinances of variation. The case example par 
excellence of the “double-bind” is, invariably, the Oedipus complex, where all 
desires and actions are determined (by psychoanalysis) in advance to be 
expressions of a type-based identity complex. The third paralogism, the 
“paralogism of application,” is a misconstrual of the conjunctive synthesis. Just as 
the previous “paralogism of extrapolation” reduces the being and behavior of an 
entity as equivalent to the single quality or limited set of qualities that an entity 
lacks, the “paralogism of application” organizes the determinant cause of all 
action as being symbolically organized. By negating any notion of agency (not to 
be conflated with free will, for Deleuze is a Spinozist determinist), with the 
“paralogism of application” the being of the subject undergoes an “explicit 
reduction to an empty form, from which desire itself is absent and expelled.”281 
Given any internal relation, the subject is reduced to a mirror, moment, position, 
record, or representation—enacting a grand collapse, the “paralogism of 
application” takes the “polyvocity” implied by the conjunctive synthesis and 
reduces it into a “biunivocity.”282 Novelty is reduced to variation of the same 
Spiel—here, the “nomadism” implied in the logic of the celibate machine and 
relations of differential heterogenesis are replaced by “segregation,” assigned to 
an inescapable organizer—a vacuum that appearances in psychoanalysis, 
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relationism, and reductionism, alike.283  
The first three paralogisms produce the “paralogism of displacement,”284 
where that which is actively occurring within a particular relation is forged to be 
transcendentally thought, instead of empirical. Kleinherenbrink provides the 
example of the Aristotelian idea that heavy objects “strive” to be at the center of 
the universe, which is “then used as an explanation for why it takes effort to lift 
them”; thus, the logic of displacement, involving a “repressed representative,” a 
“repressing representation,” and a displaced represented” points to a “code 
outside of its relational coding.”285  
Desiring production need not always involve an actuality, as each entity solely 
relates to the actual manifestation of other entities, which means it can 
mereologically register “that which it takes as its parts insofar as it is actual.”286 
For Deleuze, something must occur in actuality if an entity is to be generated, 
ushered towards becoming. The “paralogism of the afterward”287 refers to the 
thought that such actualities, themselves, do not refer to unique virtualities of 
their own. For example, consider the central thesis in Anti-Oedipus: the Oedipus 
complex is understood to be the actual generator for thoughts, behaviors, and events 
without ever being generated by these (machines)—according to psychoanalysis, 
the Oedipus complex is an actuality without virtuality. Being generated from 
other entities involves its becoming and is therefore self-identical and 
unengendered. That is, the Oedipus complex is understood to be divine and 
supervenient instead of being just another social machine with its own generators 
and private virtuality.288 Similarly, reductive materialism constitutes the 
homogenous and universal ground for everything by extending the known realm 
of physics into an ideal and complete Theory of Everything, therein projecting 
actuality onto virtuality. As Kleinherenbrink remarks, “[s]uch philosophies of 
false depth think that all entities take something quite unlike themselves for their 
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matter, without this matter taking something quite unlike itself for its matter.”289 
In the previous example, the assumed reductive-physicalist Theory of Everything 
is unable to account for the superposition of quantum mechanics, for instance, or 
problems of scalar reduction.290 
Accordingly, representation can only think of difference extrinsically by 
building a system of predicative oppositions within the concept, but Deleuze’s 
empiricist method conceives of difference intrinsically. This is because Deleuze’s 
system of constructive empiricism conceives of how the aesthetic manifold divides 
itself, illuminating that conceptualization distorts real difference without necessarily 
barring the very real possibility of conceptualizing conditions of real experience 
within a “science of the sensible.” The Deleuzean subject emerges as part of the 
natural world while nonetheless functioning as a catalyst for morphogenesis. 
Deleuze’s pluralist transcendental empiricism is opposed to Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, where transcendental subjectivity foregoes the possibility of 
conceiving of different and differential relations and interactions between entities 
themselves. As an internalist, Kant is committed to reducing all activity to 
apparitions of a subject, while transcendental empiricism is properly 
schizophrenic, “in which entity is a machine with its own malleable and 
transcendental essence, an internal ‘matter’ based on which it encounters its 
world.”291 What Deleuze’s system shares with Kant is that it is predicated on 
human finitude (that we are finite beings due to relations and terms being hinged 
upon externality) and the power of thought (where the transcendental exacts limit 
conditions). For Deleuze, we still learn about the “interior” of other machines 
insofar as we take extensive and actual manifestations as signs of virtuality, which 
is why Deleuze’s thought cannot make transcendental reality present to us despite 
it can realize entities do have individual transcendental reality. While this cannot 
produce theories that account for internal being it, nonetheless, allows for a 
theory of difference where machines manifest under determinate circumstances 
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which, for instance, is fundamentally precluded from Garcia’s system. For 
instance, as they are classically conceived, atoms are identical to one another in 
their actuality but, because they differ minimally in their virtuality, Deleuze’s 
machine ontology guarantees irreducibility—such “internal difference between 
series” allows for “one story” to not “reproduce the other” as “one does not serve 
as model for the other: rather, resemblance and identity are only functional 
efforts of that difference which alone is originary within the system.”292  
This is a system that privileges thought, which can move beyond the sensible 
to consider the “being of  the sensible”293—this is why, contra affect theory, 
Deleuze does not privilege feeling over thought. Thought is able to go beyond 
mere appearances of appearances within consciousness294 and, therefore, “only 
intelligence extracts the truth.”295 This does not mean that thinking machines do 
not encounter limit-conditions. Quite the contrary, in fact, as the empirical is 
never transcendental and, therefore, no Idea is directly available to the “goal of 
reminiscence” as a “stable Essence,” but is withdrawn to its virtuality, where it 
undergoes “qualitative transitions.”296 
 As sociologist Niklas Luhmann notes, remarking on system-specific 
distinctions, the connection with the reality of an external world and cognitive 
agents is established by the “blind spot of the cognitive operation” because 
“[r]eality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it.”297 For both Bryant 
and Deleuze, the transcendental illusion is generated in the behavior through 
which objects relate to one another and, consequentially, how “the states 
‘experienced’ by a system are treated as other objects themselves, rather than 
system-specific entities generated by the organization of the object itself.”298 For 
Harman, the Heideggerian disposition in which objects withdraw from our 
epistemic and practical grasp serves as an ideal model for the noninteraction of 
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all objects with one another in zero-sum terms. Harman’s typology of change is 
directed towards functional ends, with an object either acting towards or against 
the system's end. Deleuze’s machine ontology warrants withdrawal so as to 
galvanize a dynamics systems approach, capturing complex behaviors without 
appealing to Harman’s all-or-nothing terms. 
Much like Mark Wilson’s admission of the descriptive labor and “Theory T 
thinking” employed by generalized solutions in classical chemical and physical 
systems299 and Giuseppe Longo’s acknowledgement of how continuous machines 
overdetermine discrete machines,300 Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” 
designates how indirect approximations are the only way by which we come to 
terms with the “inner beings” of machines. As Deleuze remarks, we can make 
sense of the virtual-actual distinction via relational currents “from the outside 
and through successive experiments.”301 These currents act as a mask, behind 
which a succession of masks exist. For Deleuze, knowledge concerns either the: i) 
actual components generating an entity, or ii) the actual part an entity that plays 
in the generation of something else. However, neither of these yield the virtual 
being of any machine, but are simply functional masks, operations akin to a 
“geometrical description.”302 No typology provides us the virtual description in 
itself but gives us an apprenticeship of masks and signs, virtual objects translated 
into extensity. For Deleuze, because all reductions fail, all signs are relational, 
appearing as “sensuous impressions or qualities.”303 Therefore, signs are material—
this does not mean that they are made of tangible components or matter but that 
they have their life in something else, something “not altogether spiritual”304 but 
relational. As a consequence, “what we call an ‘object’ is only the effect an object 
has on our body.”305 Thus, the material meaning of a sign is “nothing without an 
ideal essence that it incarnates,”306 as individual entities have virtual essences that 
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withdraw from all relations. 
§ CONCLUSION 
Engaging in a close analysis with Kleinherenbrink’s work, Against Continuity, this 
paper has sought to weave a latticework that recovers a hitherto overlooked 
machine ontology and externality thesis which maintain that machines only 
encounter the actual manifestations (sense-events and flows) of other machines 
rather than the virtual aspects of machines meeting directly. In turn, we have 
sought to galvanize a rigorous close reading of Deleuze that treats machines as a 
“minimum real unit.”307 We can further elaborate that the machine has four 
aspects: two of these comprise its virtual and non-relational aspect, while the two 
others its actual manifestations in relations—a machine’s body comprises its virtual 
unity while the machine’s Idea (its singularities or powers) comprises virtual 
specificity (this rather than that machine, as noted by our comparative analysis 
with Garcia’s de-determination).  
In The Logic of  Sense, continuity is not a feature of the virtual realm, but one 
that belongs to sense-events, or actuality. Continuity is contingent, “in that it 
needs to be established and in that it can collapse.”308 In Anti-Oedipus, continuity 
is, similarly, regarded as a local and temporal achievement that occurs on the 
plane of actuality, conditioned by ontological breakages qua externality and by 
machines.309 Contra Platonist essentialism and Leibniz’ monadology, for Deleuze 
univocity does not “mean that there is one and the same Being; on the contrary, 
beings are multiple and different […] That of which it is said is not at all the 
same, but Being is the same for everything about which it is said.”310  
Perhaps Kleinherenbrink’s boldest statement, which this paper has tried to 
support, is that Deleuze is an object-oriented philosopher whose machine 
ontology adheres to some of the positions postulated by speculative realism. 
Within the camp of speculative realist and object-oriented philosophers we have 
reviewed, we saw the emergence of a metaphysics that is both internalist and 
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externalist. For Bryant and DeLanda, for instance, discrete entities are designated 
as internal to larger continuous domains, whereby the virtual is relegated to pure 
productive forces (“chaos itself, or anything else”).311 In Meillassoux’s anti-
correlationist system and Ray Brassier’s Sellarsian scientific formulation, realism’s 
reality exists independently from human experience and/or thought despite it 
can be grasped through the application of privileged procedures (e.g., kenotypic 
signs-cum-mathematics or natural sciences, respectively). For Gabriel, Garcia, 
and with Latour’s ontologization through mutual association qua actants, 
individual entities supervene upon reality by defining relationally determined 
entities—this is the case regardless of whether we are speaking of primary or 
secondary qualities (or, in Garcian lexicon, “form” and “object”). Nonetheless, in 
a mode that is altogether unique from these philosophers, Deleuze staunchly and 
rigorously produces an externalist ontology “in which every machine has an 
interior that can never be reduced or even presented to other beings,”312 as 
irreducible singularities have to undergo translation in order to be generated. 
Despite Harman also has a rather staunch theory of externality, Deleuze’s 
machine ontology restricts the occasions through which interior entities can 
change, whereas Harman fails to produce any such gradient. Deleuze’s machine 
ontology and externality thesis produce a critical point of departure, evincing 
how every entity is an irreducible singularity that can merely be translated into 
relations vis-à-vis difference in kind between internal virtual content and absolute 
actuality. 
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